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Decision	  Architecture	  and	  Implicit	  Time	  Horizons 
Lisa Zaval 
Recent research on judgment and decision making emphasizes decision 
architecture, the task and contextual features of a decision setting that influence how 
preferences are constructed (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). In a series of three papers, this 
dissertation considers architectural features related to the intertemporal structure of the 
decision setting that influence cognition, motivation, and emotion, and include 
modifications of (i) informational, (ii) experiential, (iii) procedural, and (iv) emotional 
environments. This research also identifies obstacles to decision making, whether that 
obstacle is an individual difference (e.g., age-related change in emotional processing) or a 
temporary state (e.g., a change in motivational focus, or sensitivity to irrelevant features 
of the decision setting).	  Papers 1 and 2 focus on decision architecture related to 
environmentally-relevant decisions, investigating how structural features of the decision 
task can trigger different choice processes and behavior. Paper 1 explores a potential 
mechanism behind constructed preferences relating to climate change belief and explores 
why these preferences are sensitive to normatively irrelevant features of the judgment 
context, such as transient outdoor temperature. Paper 2 examines new ways of 
emphasizing time and uncertainty with the aim of turning psychological obstacles into 
opportunities, accomplished by making legacy motives more salient to shift preferences 
from present-future and self-other trade-offs at the point of decision making.  Paper 3 
examines how the temporal horizon of a decision setting influences predicted future 
preferences within the domain of affective forecasting. In addition, Paper 3 explores how 
individual and situational differences might affect the match (or mismatch) between 
predicted and experienced outcomes by examining differences in forecasting biases 
among older versus younger adults. Taken together, these three papers aim to encourage 
individuals to make decisions that are not overshadowed by short-term goals or other 
constraints, with the aim of producing actionable modifications for policy-makers in the 
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Behavioral decision research has firmly established that people’s preferences in 
response to a judgment task are often constructed in the immediate context of decision 
making (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992; Slovic, 1995). 
People construct their preferences because decision settings are often complex, involving 
many alternatives, with uncertain outcomes. For example, attitudes towards climate 
change (a complex and presently contentious topic) appear to be malleable and 
constructed at the moment of elicitation, rather than simply retrieved from memory (Li, 
Johnson, & Zaval, 2011; Weber & Johnson, 2009). The concept of preference 
construction has led to an increased understanding of the contextual variables that 
influence preferences and attitudes, including the decision context (i.e., the level of 
uncertainty), the decision goal (i.e., accuracy versus minimal efforts) and various 
individual differences (i.e., level of experience).  
Recent research on judgment and decision making emphasizes decision 
architecture, that is, the features of a decision setting that influence how preferences are 
constructed (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Decision settings have many structural features 
that potentially can be varied, and which serve as entry points for the design of decision 
environments. These structural features can influence the evidence and goals that the 
decision maker considers, as well as other features of the process of preference 
construction. Examples include how outcomes are framed and what intertemporal 
structure is implied in the setting.  
	   2	  
Indeed, the implicit intertemporal structure of a decision task has important 
implications for decision architecture (Hardisty et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2012). Many 
decisions involve future outcomes that take place over long time horizons, which may 
influence preference construction in several ways. First, future outcomes generally 
involve a high degree of uncertainty, which can cause the decision maker’s preferences 
for future outcomes to become unclear. This can lead to an over-weighting or under-
weighing of future outcomes. For example, the long time horizon and ambiguity 
associated with the consequences of climate change serve as obstacles to pro-
environmental decisions, resulting in an underinvestment of present mitigation efforts 
(Gifford, 2011; Kunreuther & Weber, in press; Petrovic, Madrigano & Zaval, under 
review; Weber & Stern, 2011). Secondly, future uncertainty can cause the decision maker 
to become overly sensitive to certain highly salient future outcomes. For example, in the 
context of affective forecasting, people tend to overestimate affective reactions to future 
decisions by failing to consider the extent to which peripheral events may influence their 
emotional responses (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).  
By examining how the temporal horizon of a decision-making setting affects 
observed (constructed) preferences, and understanding the cognitive and emotional 
processes involved, the decision architecture can create better tools to overcome 
intertemporal biases. With this in mind, this dissertation considers architectural features 
related to the intertemporal structure of the decision setting that influence cognition, 
motivation, and emotion, and include modifications of (i) informational, (ii) experiential, 
(iii) procedural, and (iv) emotional environments. This dissertation also considers and 
identifies various obstacles to decision making; including whether that obstacle is an 
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individual difference (e.g., age-related changes in emotional processing) or a temporary 
state (e.g., a change in motivational focus, or sensitivity to irrelevant features of the 
environment). These research questions are examined in a series of three papers, which 
together report results from ten empirical studies and experiments involving over 2,500 
participants. 
The concept of decision architecture has implications for several consumer and 
public policy domains in which individuals regularly experience suboptimal decisions. 
However, relatively little is known about how decision architecture affects environmental 
decisions. Accordingly, Papers 1 and 2 of this dissertation focus on decision architecture 
that is related to environmentally-relevant decisions, and investigates how structural 
features of the decision setting can trigger different choice processes and behavior. Long 
time horizons and uncertainty pose major challenges for effective decision architecture 
for environmental decisions. Paper 1 explores a potential mechanism behind observed 
(constructed) preferences relating to climate change belief, as evidenced by the fact that 
these preferences are often sensitive to salient, but normally irrelevant features of the 
judgment context, including transient outdoor temperature.  Paper 2 examines how the 
psychological barriers of time and uncertainty can be turned into opportunities, by 
making legacy motives more salient, resulting in shifting preferences for present-future 
and self-other trade-offs at the point of decision making.  
Decisions involving long time horizons often involve making predictions about 
future outcomes and preferences, which in turn may or may not coincide with 
experienced outcomes (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). However, relatively 
little is known about how individual and situational differences might affect the match or 
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mismatch between the two. The third paper in this dissertation thus explores the 
interactions of temporal structure and individual or situational differences in level of 
experience, another important contextual variable that influences preference construction. 
This paper examines the processes involved in how the temporal horizon of a decision 
setting influences predicted future preferences within the domain of hedonic forecasting. 
Paper 3 also examines the role of individual differences in emotional experience, by 
examining potential differences in forecasting biases among older and younger 
participants. This work suggests that theories and policies involving decision architecture 
must distinguish between targeted decision makers, in order to accurately describe and 
predict people's preferences. Taken together, the three papers in this dissertation call 
upon policy-makers to actively adjust and monitor their presentation of information, so 
that individuals may make decisions that are not overshadowed by short-term goals or 












	   5	  
References 
 
Gifford, R. (2011). The dragons of inaction: Psychological barriers that limit climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. American Psychologist, 66(4), 290.  
Hardisty, D. J., Orlove, B., Krantz, D. H., Small, A. A., Milch, K. F., & Osgood, D. E. 
(2012). About time: An integrative approach to effective environmental policy. 
Global Environmental Change, 22(3), 684-694.  
Johnson, E. J., Shu, S. B., Dellaert, B. G., Fox, C., Goldstein, D. G., Häubl, G., . . . 
Schkade, D. (2012). Beyond nudges: Tools of a choice architecture. Marketing 
Letters, 23(2), 487-504.  
Kunreuther, H., & Weber, E. U. (in press). Aiding Decision Making to Reduce the 
Impacts of Climate Change. Journal of Consumer Policy.  
Li, Y., Johnson, E. J., & Zaval, L. (2011). Local Warming: Daily Temperature Change 
Influences Belief in Global Warming. Psychological Science, 22(4), 454-459. doi: 
10.1177/0956797611400913 
Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (2006). The construction of preference: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Loewenstein, G., O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2003). Projection bias in predicting 
future utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1209-1248.  
Markowitz, E. M., & Shariff, A. F. (2012). Climate Change and Moral Judgement. 
Nature Climate Change, 2(4), 243-247.  
Petrovic, N., J. Madrigano, Zaval, L. (Under Review). Motivating Mitigation: When 
Health Matters more than Climate Change. Center for Research on Environmental 
Decisions Working Paper, Columbia University. 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1992). Behavioral decision research: A 
constructive processing perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 87-131.  
Schkade, D. A., & Kahneman, D. (1998). Does living in California make people happy?  
A focusing illusion in judgments of life satisfaction. Psychological Science, 9(5), 
340-346.  
Slovic, P. (1995). The construction of preference. American Psychologist, 50(5), 364.  
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, 
wealth, and happiness: Yale University Press. 
Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2009). Mindful judgment and decision making. Annual 
review of psychology, 60, 53-85.  
Weber, E. U., & Stern, P. C. (2011). Public understanding of climate change in the 
United States. American Psychologist, 66(4), 315.  
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2003). Affective forecasting. In M. P. Z (Ed.), Advances 













Paper 1: How warm days increase belief in global warming 
 
Lisa Zaval, Elizabeth A. Keenan, Eric J. Johnson, and Elke U. Weber  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Attribute Substitution, Decision Making, Environmental Behavior, 
Constructed Preferences  
 
 
Author note: Reproduced with permission from Nature Publishing Group from Zaval, L., 
Keenan, E.A., Johnson, E.J., & Weber, E.U. (2014). How warm days increase belief in 
global warming. Nature Climate Change, DOI 10.1038/nclimate2093. This research has 
been supported by the NIA Grant 5R01AG027934 and the NSF IGERT Grant 0903551. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lisa Zaval, Columbia 
University, Department of Psychology, 419 Schermerhorn, 1190 Amsterdam Avenue 
MC: 5501, New York, NY, 10027, e-mail: lz2261@columbia.edu 
	   7	  
Abstract 
Climate change judgments can depend on whether today seems warmer or colder than 
usual, termed the “local warming” effect. While previous research has demonstrated that 
this effect occurs, studies have yet to elucidate why or how temperature abnormalities 
influence global warming attitudes. A better understanding of the underlying psychology 
of this effect can help explain the public’s reaction to climate change and inform 
approaches used to communicate the phenomenon. Across five studies, we find evidence 
of attribute substitution, whereby individuals use less relevant but available information 
(e.g., today’s temperature) in place of more diagnostic but less accessible information 
(e.g., global climate change patterns) when making judgments. Moreover, we rule out 
alternative hypotheses involving climate change labeling and lay mental models. 
Ultimately, we show current temperature abnormalities are given undue weight and lead 
to an overestimation of the frequency of similar past events, thereby increasing belief in 
and concern for global warming.  
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How warm days increase belief in global warming 
During a particularly hot summer in 1988, James Hansen testified before a 
congressional hearing on the dangers of global warming. The night before his testimony, 
committee members had opened the room’s windows and turned off the air conditioning, 
hoping the sweltering heat would underscore Hansen’s warnings and make the 
greenhouse effect concrete to anyone present (Pielke, 2000). This intuition, that today’s 
temperature would affect climate change beliefs, anticipates a more recent finding that 
subjective temperature does, in reality, affect reported beliefs in climate change. 
Given that the challenge of reducing carbon emissions depends, in part, on 
changes in individual behavior, it is important to understand the basis of global climate 
change perception and concern. Notably, individuals’ beliefs about the phenomenon 
appear to be constructed at the moment of elicitation, rather than simply retrieved from 
memory (Weber & Johnson, 2009). This is demonstrated by the fact that individuals are 
sensitive to normatively irrelevant features of the judgment context, including transient 
temperature (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008; Egan & Mullin, 2009; Howe, 
Markowitz, Lee, Ko, & Leiserowitz, 2013; Joireman, Barnes Truelove, & Duell, 2010; 
Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, & Visser, 2006; Risen & Critcher, 2011; Ungar, 1992). 
Mounting evidence shows personal experience with the daily weather tends to dominate 
more diagnostic but paler statistical information provided by “experts” (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004), 
because the former is more vivid and accessible. Importantly, perceived abnormalities in 
current temperature have been linked causally with changes in belief in global warming, 
an effect termed ‘local warming’ (Li, Johnson, & Zaval, 2011). Specifically, respondents 
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who perceived today’s temperature as being “warmer than usual” exhibited greater belief 
in and heightened concern for global warming and also donated more money to a climate 
change charity.  
Despite accumulating evidence that global warming judgments are influenced by 
short-lived temperature variation and local weather, the underlying psychological 
processes regarding how or why this relationship occurs have not been fully explored in 
the literature (see Supplementary Table 1 for a review of existing literature). There are at 
least three mechanisms by which transient, local temperatures may influence individuals’ 
judgments about global climate change. One mechanism suggests that choice option 
labels influence belief construction. For many issues, subtle changes in question 
terminology can result in pronounced differences in obtained answers (Schuman & 
Presser, 1996; Schwarz, 2001), a phenomenon supported by the literature on attribute 
framing effects in decision research (Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010; Petrovic, 
Madrigano, & Zaval, under review; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Specifically, the term 
“global warming”, which has been used in previous studies, may prime heat-related 
cognitions, leading to biased judgments. Second, the local warming effect could be due to 
a knowledge deficit on the part of respondents, causing them to mistakenly believe that 
long-term climate and short-term temperature deviations are highly related. A third 
explanation, rooted in the cognitive heuristics literature (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 
2002), proposes that individuals use less relevant but salient and available information 
(e.g., today’s temperature) in place of more diagnostic but less accessible information 
(e.g., global climate change patterns) in belief generation. While this process, known as 
attribute substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), may seem highly irrational if done 
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consciously and explicitly, other psychological process implementations give it greater 
plausibility. In particular, we suggest that unusually warm or cold weather conditions 
may increase the availability of other unusual warm or cold temperature events in 
memory, changing estimates of the frequency of such events, and thereby affecting 
respondents’ global warming attitudes. To preview our results, we find evidence for only 
the last of these three mechanisms.  
STUDY 1 
Study 1 explored whether the local warming effect is caused by the use of the 
term “global warming” in question wording. “Global warming” may prime associations 
of heat-related impacts and rising temperatures (Leiserowitz, 2005), whereas the term 
"climate change" is more readily associated with a wider range of weather events 
(Whitmarsh, 2009). To examine if the influence of perceived temperature depends on the 
phrasing of the survey question, we asked respondents about their belief in and concern 
for “Global Warming” or “Climate Change”. Participants also reported whether the local 
temperature on the day they completed the survey was colder or warmer than usual for 
that time of year.  
Methods 
In Studies 1, 682 U.S. participants were recruited from the website Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, where participants can take short surveys online in exchange for small 
payments (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011)1. See Supplementary Information for 
demographic details for all studies. These panels represent a wide range of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  These panels represent a wide range of socioeconomic factors not seen in university lab settings. Notably, 
the effect of temperature on global warming judgments has also been corroborated in nationally 
representative panels (Egan & Mullin, 2012; Howe, Markowitz, Lee, Ko, & Leiserowitz, 2012).	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socioeconomic factors not seen in university lab settings. Notably, the effect of 
temperature on global warming judgments has also been corroborated in nationally 
representative panels (Egan & Mullin, 2012; Howe et al., 2012). 
In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to the global warming vs. climate 
change conditions and answered three standard questions, based on the methodology used 
by Li et al., 2011. Respondents reported how convinced they were “that ‘global warming’ 
[‘climate change’] is happening” and how much they “personally worried about ‘global 
warming’ [‘climate change’]. Response options ranged from 1 (not at all 
convinced/worried) to 4 (completely convinced/a great deal worried). These questions 
and response scales were adapted from prior public-opinion studies about global warming 
(Leiserowitz, Shome, Marx, Hammer, & Broad, 2008). Belief and concern correlated 
significantly in this and all subsequent studies (r = .59, p < .01). Participants also reported 
whether the local temperature on the day they completed the survey was colder or 
warmer than usual for that time of year, using a 5-point scale that ranged from −2 (much 
colder) to 2 (much warmer). The belief question came before the concern question, in this 
and all subsequent studies; however, the presentation order of the belief/concern and 
temperature questions was counterbalanced. In addition to these questions in this and all 
other studies, respondents provided information about political affiliation and extensive 
demographic information. We also collected actual temperature and historical 
temperature deviation data for the day that participants completed the studies, using their 
ZIP code information (see Supplementary Information for actual temperature data 
collection methods).  
Results  
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Results from Study 1 show that the overall effect of perceived temperature 
deviation on belief in and concern for global climate change persisted whether the 
phenomenon was described as climate change or global warming. A multiple regression 
testing the effect of perceived temperature, framing condition (Warming vs. Change), and 
their interaction on belief and concern revealed a main effect of perceived temperature on 
concern, β = 0.16, t(683) = 3.03, p < .01, and a marginally significant effect on belief, β = 
0.10, t(683) = 1.73, p = .08. However, the interactions were not significant (concern, p = 
.64 and belief, p = .47), suggesting that there was no effect of phrasing (see Figure 1). We 
conducted a number of additional regressions that directly control for actual temperature, 
actual deviation from the historical average, gender, education, age, income, political 
affiliation, environmental attitude, and subjective knowledge of the phenomenon (see 
Supplementary Tables 3-A and 3-B). The effect of perceived temperature remained 
significant in the presence of these controls for both frames. Additionally, to control for 
reverse causality and omitted variable biases, we employed instrumental variable 
regression, an econometric tool used to help establish causality in observational data 
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001; Sargan, 1958). Using actual temperature deviation as an 
instrument for perceived deviation, we causally link perceived temperature abnormalities 
with changes in global warming attitude (see Supplementary Analyses). While attribute 
labels can produce pronounced differences in judgments and choices (Payne, 1951; 
Schuldt, Konrath, & Schwarz, 2011), termed attribute framing effects in decision 
research (Hardisty et al., 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the idea that the local 
warming effect is simply caused by being primed with the term global warming was not 
supported by our results.   
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Fig. 1. Climate change labeling and local warming. Level of belief in and concern 
about climate change (CC) and global warming (GW) as a function of perceived 
temperature deviation (Study 1). Bars denote ±1 SEM. 
 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 tested the possibility that participants have limited understanding of 
climate science and incorrectly believe that today’s local temperature is relevant 
information to use in global warming judgments.  Local short-term and broad long-term 
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and time that climate change patterns emerge (Solomon et al., 2007). If the local warming 
effect is due to a lay understanding that local temperature is a useful metric for predicting 
long-term temperature trends, then information about the scientific distinction between 
local temperature and global climate change should reduce or eliminate the local 
warming effect.  
Methods 
In Studies 2, 330 U.S. participants were recruited via Columbia University’s 
Center for Decision Sciences national panel, which consists of over 56,500 people who 
have agreed to participate in psychological and decision research for financial 
compensation. We randomly assigned participants to either an information or no-
information (control) condition. Those in the information condition read a passage 
highlighting the differences between minor weather fluctuations and global climate 
change, which constituted our manipulation of knowledge, while those in the no-
information condition read a passage on the science of sleep. (See Supplementary 
Information for Study 2 passages). Participants were told that the purpose of the research 
was to “determine the best way to present scientific information to the general public”. 
Both passages were similar in length and educational in tone. To check our manipulation 
of knowledge, we examined whether participants in the information condition correctly 
answered an open-ended question about the difference between daily temperature and 
climate. Two coders independently categorized level of understanding (Cohen’s Kappa 
measurement for agreement was .83, p < .01), and found that 82% of participants 
responded accurately. Only these participants were included in analyses. Participants 
were also asked to state what they thought the specific purpose of the study was. None of 
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the participants correctly guessed the true purpose of the research. All participants then 
completed an unrelated filler task and answered the same temperature, belief, and 
concern questions used in Study 1. 
Results  
 Results from Study 2 show that increased knowledge does not eliminate the local 
warming effect. A moderation analysis using hierarchical multiple regression revealed a 
main effect of perceived temperature deviation on belief (β = 0.16, p = 0.02), but there 
was no main effect of information (β = 0.08, p = 0.76). Importantly, the Information x 
Perceived Temperature interaction term was also non-significant (β = 0.04, p = 0.67).  
Similarly, for concern, we find a main effect of perceived temperature deviation (β = 
0.14, p = 0.04), but neither a main nor an interaction effect for the information condition. 
Participants in the information condition were more likely to believe in and be concerned 
about global warming if they perceived today to be warmer than usual (belief, β = 0.14, 
t(132) = 3.27, p < .01 and concern, β = 0.15, t(132) = 0.16, p = 0.03), suggesting that the 
effect of perceived temperature on climate change perceptions cannot be attributed to a 
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Fig. 2. Information, recency, and local warming. (1) Level of belief in and concern 
about global warming as a function of perceived temperature deviation, given 
information (Study 2). (2) Level of belief in and concern about global warming as a 
function of yesterday’s perceived temperature deviation (Study 3b). Bars denote ±1 SEM. 
STUDY 3A 
Having eliminated the first two possible mechanisms, we turn to examining the 
details of attribute substitution. Specifically, we hypothesized that the availability of 
today’s temperature deviation may make today’s temperature observation 
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& Kahneman, 1973; Williams & Bargh, 2008), and affecting respondents’ global climate 
change judgments. This interpretation has several testable implications, which we 
examine in the following studies. Ultimately, we provide a process-level explanation for 
how attribute substitution leads to biased judgments about global warming.  
Studies 3a and 3b examined the role of accessibility of temperature abnormalities. 
In Study 3a, we manipulated accessibility using a priming methodology. A body of 
research in psychology suggests that behaviors and social inferences can be subtly 
influenced through the use of temperature primes (Ijzerman & Semin, 2009; Joireman et 
al., 2010; Williams & Bargh, 2008). We hypothesized that when the concept of heat or 
cold is activated in one’s mind (primed), that concept will more likely be used for 
subsequent evaluation of global warming.  
Methods 
In Study 3a, 300 participants, recruited from Mechanical Turk, answered the 
standard temperature perception question, and completed 10 minutes of unrelated filler 
material, and were then assigned to one of three experimental conditions: They 
completed one version (heat-prime, cold-prime, or control) of a scrambled-sentences 
priming task (Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007). (See Supplementary Methods for Study 3a 
scrambled-sentences text). Mean perceived temperature ratings did not differ by 
condition (F(2, 288) = 0.07, p = .93), supporting random assignment of participants to 
conditions. The scrambled-sentences priming task consisted of 13 sets of 5 scrambled 
words containing heat-related, cold-related, or neutral words (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-
Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Ijzerman & Semin, 2009).  For each set of available 
words, participants chose four words to make a grammatically correct sentence (see 
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Supplementary Methods for scrambled-sentences text). Participants were told that the 
task was designed to “clear their minds” before other measures were taken. Twelve 
subjects did not complete the sentence task, and were removed from further analysis. 
After completing the scrambled-sentences task, all participants reported their belief in 
and concern about global warming. 
Results 
Supporting the role of immediate temperature perception in generating the local 
warming effect, we find that priming individuals with heat-related cognitions increases 
levels of belief and concern in global warming. The priming manipulation had a direct 
effect on average ratings of reported belief in and concern about global warming, as 
shown in Figure 3. There was a significant main effect of condition on global-warming 
belief, F(2, 288) = 3.88, p = .02, and concern, F(2, 288) = 4.74, p = .01. Post hoc 
comparisons showed that those in the Heat condition showed greater concern for global 
warming than those in the Control condition (p = .02) and Cold condition (p = .03). 
Similarly, those in the Heat condition showed greater belief in global warming than those 
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Fig. 3. Temperature priming and local warming. Effect of cold and heat temperature 
primes on global warming belief and concern (Study 3a). Bars denote ±1 SEM. 
 
STUDY 3B 
Study 3b examined the need for recency of temperature abnormalities by 
exploring whether prompting people to think about yesterday’s perceived temperature 
deviation also affects their belief in or concern about global warming. We predicted that 
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past temperature events, such as the previous day’s temperature, will have less influence 
on global warming belief and concern.  
Methods 
 In Study 3b, 251 participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk. Unlike 
previous studies, all participants were first asked about ‘yesterday’s’ temperature rather 
that the current day’s temperature. Participants responded using a 5-point scale that 
ranged from 1 (much colder) to 5 (much warmer). Respondents then reported their belief 
in and concern about global warming. In addition to calculating the current day’s 
objective temperature deviations, we used participants’ ZIP code information to calculate 
objective temperature deviations for the day before subjects participated (yesterday). 
Note that Study 3b did not include a control condition in which participants were asked 
about today’s temperature, and this prevents us from completely ruling out the possibility 
that we would not have found the local warming effect in this particular sample. This is 
unlikely, however, given the robust nature of the effect in previous studies drawn from 
the same subject pool.  
Results 
Asking respondents about yesterday’s temperature eliminated the relationship 
between perceived temperature deviation and global warming judgments.  This suggests 
that the immediacy of experience with temperature affects judgments of global climate 
change. Linear regressions revealed that perceived deviation of yesterday’s temperature 
had no effect on belief, β = -0.02, t(250) = -0.38, p = .70 or concern, β = 0.08, t(250) = 
1.30, p = 0.20 (see Figure 2). When controlling for political affiliation and other 
demographic variables, the results remain non-significant for belief, β = -0.06, t(208) = -
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0.79, p = .43 and concern, β = 0.03, t(208) = .43, p = .67 (see Supplementary Tables 4-A 
and 4-B).   To confirm that subjects were attending to yesterday’s temperature deviation, 
and not today’s temperature, we compared yesterday’s perceived temperature ratings 
with actual objective temperature deviations from the historical average for both 
yesterday and today. Results show that yesterday’s perceived temperature deviation 
correlated positively with yesterday’s actual deviation from the historical average (rs = 
.26, p < .01). However, yesterday’s perceived temperature deviation did not correlate 
with today’s actual temperature deviation (rs = .08, p = 0.23); suggesting that participants 
were indeed attending to yesterday’s temperature, and not today’s temperature. 
Additional regressions controlled for actual temperature and demographic factors, 
including political affiliation (see Supplementary Tables 4-A and 4-B), and found that the 
effect of perceived deviation on belief and concern remained non-significant. These 
findings suggest that it is the immediacy of experience with temperature that affects 
judgments of global climate change. Although one difference between yesterday and 
today relates to recency of experience, another important distinction is that the former is a 
memory and the latter is currently experienced as sensory input. Thus, our results are also	  
consistent with the hypothesis that beliefs are influenced by the use of the most salient 
sensory information available (e.g., perceived deviation of today’s temperature).  
STUDY 4 
In Study 4, we further investigated our proposed mechanism for attribute 
substitution, namely construct-consistent recall from memory. We hypothesized that 
thinking about today’s unusually warm weather will increase the availability of other 
unusually warm temperature events from memory, leading respondents to overestimate 
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the frequency of such events. To test this hypothesis, we examined whether days that are 
perceived as being warmer than usual lead one to overestimate the frequency of 
unusually warm days throughout the year and whether this overestimation mediates the 
local warming effect.  
Methods 
In Study 4, 270 U.S Participants were recruited via Columbia University’s Center 
for Decision Sciences national panel. In addition to answering the temperature, belief and 
concern questions as in the preceding studies, participants were asked, “Over the past 
year, what percentage of days seemed to be ‘warmer than usual’ for that time of year, 
compared to the historical average?” Participants indicated their answer by clicking their 
mouse anywhere on a 100-point slide scale anchored by 0%, 50%, and 100%. We refer to 
this variable as ‘Percentage Days Warmer’ (PDW).  
Results 
Results reveal that people who thought today was warmer than usual reported 
more days in the year as being warmer than usual compared to people who thought today 
was colder than usual (see Figure 4). PDW was positively correlated with perceived 
temperature deviation, r = .41, p < .01, today’s actual temperature (F), r = .15, p < .05, 
and global warming belief and concern, r = .35, p < .01; r = .33, p < .01, respectively. A 
regression controlling for today’s actual temperature and today’s objective temperature 
deviation reveals perceived temperature deviation influenced PDW, β = 0.39, t(269) = 
7.4,  p < .01. This suggests that attention to and perception of today’s temperature, and 
not actual temperature deviation, affects recall of past temperature events. Path analysis 
conducted to test our mediation hypotheses indicates that perceived PDW partially 
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mediates the effect of perceived temperature deviation on belief in and concern about 
global warming. A Sobel Z test showed a similar effect on belief in global warming 
(perceived deviation, direct: t(270) = 4.92, perceived deviation, mediated: t(268) = 2.74, 
boot-strapped Sobel’s Z = 3.91, p < .01) and concern about global warming (perceived 
deviation, direct: t(270) = 3.84, perceived deviation, mediated: t(268) = 1.62, boot-
strapped Sobel’s Z = 4.02, p < .01). Results from Study 4 suggest that those who perceive 
today to be warmer than usual are more likely to overestimate the frequency of unusually 
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Fig. 4. Perceived percentage days warmer and local warming. Perceived Percentage 
Days Warmer (left y-axis) and belief in and concern about global warming (right y-axis) 
as a function of perceived deviation from the usual temperature (Study 4). Bars ±1 SEM. 
Conclusions 
A growing body of research shows that transient temperature variation influences 
the public’s opinion of global climate change. We extend this research by examining 
several hypotheses regarding why this happens and exploring the mechanisms underlying 
the local warming effect. Our results suggest that an attempt to de-bias this robust effect 
will not be easy, as changes to survey terminology and enhanced scientific knowledge do 
not eliminate the effect of perceived temperature abnormalities. Further research is 
needed to determine how people's belief in global climate change can be encouraged to 
develop over time from constructed, experienced-based reactions to more stable 
conclusions. Additionally, although we find that attribute substitution is an important 
cause of the effect, rule out two alternative explanations, and show that temperature 
priming can influence global warming attitudes, there may well be other sources of biases 
and heuristics that lead to the very stable ‘local warming effect.’ 
The local warming effect is an important real-word demonstration of how opinion 
on important issues can be constructed in response to a direct inquiry, rather than 
retrieved from memory. For climate change, a complex issue with contradictory 
coverage, individuals can draw weak conclusions and appear to reconsider their opinion 
each time they are asked a question. This characterization of climate change opinion, and 
the apparent difficulties individuals experience when dealing with uncertain climate-
related decisions, have strong implications for public policy. For instance, these findings 
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raise important questions regarding the potential role of the local warming bias in polling 
results. Our results suggest that recency and salience of warming constructs are 
promising ways of promoting heightened concern about climate change, at least among 
those who’s beliefs or disbeliefs are not well established (Weber, 2013). However, the 
opposite can also occur:  The “Snowpocalypse” of 2010 in Washington D.C. resulted in 
increased media coverage of climate skeptics denying the existence of climate change. As 
climate change continues to cause an increase in the intensity of extreme weather 
fluctuations (Francis & Vavrus, 2012), the local warming effect may lead to even greater 
confusion among the general public. Weather variability will need to become better 
associated with heightened belief in climate change, though this new association will 
need to be accomplished through education and analogies, and not personal experience. If 
the United States is to take a stronger stance against climate change, forecasters may be 
well advised to make increasing warming abnormalities more cognitively available to the 
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Supplementary Table 1. Temperature and public perception of global climate change in 
the literature. 
 
Authors Year Journal Effect 
Ungar, S. 1992 Sociological Quarterly 
Public anxiety over global warming 
peaks during hot, dry summers. 
Krosnick, J., 
Holbrook, A., 
Lowe, L., & Visser, 
P. 
2006 Climatic Change 
Self-stated personal experience of recent 
increases in local temperatures exerts 
positive effects on the on the perceptions 
of global warming. 
Semenza, J., Hall, 
D., Wilson, D., 
Bontempo, B., 
Sailor, D., & 





Concern about climate change is 
positively related to perceptions of how 
hot the temperature was on the previous 
day (mild, hot, or extremely hot). 
Brody, S.D., 
Zahran, S., Vedlitz, 
A., & Grover, H.  
2008 Environment and Behavior 
Long-term temperature trends do not 
predict individual risk perceptions of 
climate change. 
Hamilton, L., & 




Regional winter warming trends are 
associated with an increased likelihood of 
perceiving major local effects of climate 
change. 
Joireman, J., Barnes 






Belief in global warming is positively 
correlated with actual outdoor 
temperature, but only on the low end of 
the temperature range. 
Li, Y., Johnson, E. 
J., & Zaval, L. 2011 
Psychological 
Science 
Belief in and concern about global 
warming depends on whether today 
seems warmer or colder than the 
historical average, a bias termed ‘the 
local warming effect’.  
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Risen, J.L., & 
Critcher, C.R. 2011 
Attitudes and Social 
Cognition 
Outdoor and indoor ambient temperature 
predicts belief in the validity of global 
warming, and this effect is not qualified 
by political ideology. 
Egan, P. J., & 
Mullin, M. 2012 Journal of Politics 
Americans more likely to agree there is 
“solid evidence” that the earth is getting 
warmer when local temperature rises 
above normal. 
Howe, P. D., 
Markowitz, E. M., 
Lee, T. M., Ko, C., 
& Leiserowitz, A.  
2012 Nature Climate Change 
Perceptions of local temperature trends 
are most influenced by abnormal average 
temperatures in the most recent three 
months and perceptions of a long-term 
local warming trend are most associated 
with warmer recent average temperatures 
than with long-term local temperature 
trends. 
Hamilton, L.C., & 
Stampone, M.D. 2013 
Weather, Climate, 
and Society 
In a statewide sample, among 
Independents, but not Democrats or 
Republicans, belief that humans are 
changing the climate is predicted by 
temperature abnormalities on the day of 
the interview and previous day. 
Deryugina, T. 2013 Climatic Change 
Among conservatives, longer-run 
temperature fluctuations (1 month – 1 
year) are significant predictors of belief 
that the effects of global warming had 
begun to happen. 
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(N = 686) 
Study 2 
(N = 330) 
Study 3a 
(N = 300) 
Study 3b 
(N = 251) 
Study 4 
(N = 270) 
Sex, %      
    Males 43       37     49 51 52 
    Females 57 63 51 49 48 
Age, M (SD) 34 (12.7) 38 (13.1) 31 (14.46) 28 (13.5) 33 (14.9) 
Education, % 45.1 51.4 40.6 38.2 43.9 
Race/ethnicity, %      
    African American 7 5 5 3 7 
    White 74 78 73 79 75 
Polit. Affiliation, %      
    Democrat 35 40 48 53 35 
    Republican 20 23 27 16 23 
   Independent/Other 45 37 25 28 40 
U.S. Region, %      
    Northeast 22.4 27.5 25.8 25.3 31.0 
    South 35.6 28.3 30.3 28.1 28.7 
    Central 19.8 20.8 19.0 21.0 19.1 




51.1 50.8 53.3 60.2 (63.1) 60.5 
	  
Due to some participants choosing not to answer, the race/ethnicity, political affiliation 
columns do not total to 100. 
*Educational Attainment = at least some college. 
*Actual Temperature Deviation = Day of survey > 1° (F) warmer than the historical 
average temperature for each ZIP code. 
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Supplementary Table 3-A. Linear regressions for belief for GW/CC in Study 1. Note: 
Standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. Sample size is smaller for some 
regressions due to incomplete responses. * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .01. 
Model 1 2 3 
Perceived deviation 0.120*** 0.107** 0.112*** 
 (0.123) (0.114) (0.116) 
CC Frame  0.270 0.144 ** 
  (0.150) (0.079) 
Frame x perceived deviation  0.025  
  (0.026)  
Actual temperature  0.005 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.023) 
Actual deviation  -0.002 0.015 
   (0.091) 
Female  0.022 0.026 
  (0.012) (0.014) 
Education  0.032* 0.042** 
  (0.054) (0.078) 
Age   -0.001 
   (-0.011) 
Income (thousands)   0.025 
   (0.042) 
Democrat (relative to Other)  .565*** 0.549*** 
  (0.301) (0.295) 
Polit. x perceived deviation   -0.131 
   (-.120) 
Environmental attitude   0.160*** 
   (0.231) 
Knowledge   0.020 
   (0.014) 
Constant 2.532*** 2.45*** 1.83*** 
Observations 685 628 577 
R2 0.015 0.124 0.191 
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Supplementary Table 3-B. Linear regressions for concern for GW/CC in Study 1. Note: 
Standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. Sample size is smaller for some 
regressions due to incomplete responses. * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .01. 
Model 1 2 3 
Perceived deviation 0.137*** 0.133** 0.132*** 
 (0.147) (0.142) (0.142) 
CC Frame  0.027 0.063 
  (0.006) (0.036) 
Frame x perceived deviation  0.038  
  (0.041)  
Actual temperature  0.006 0.012 
  (0.070) (0.089) 
Actual deviation   0.020 
   (0.101) 
Female  0.118* 0.162** 
  (0.070) (0.091) 
Education  0.008 0.032 
  (0.016) (0.061) 
Age   -0.001 
   (-0.013) 
Income (thousands)   -0.037 
   (-0.063) 
Democrat (relative to Other)  0.437*** 0.383*** 
  (0.241) (0.210) 
Polit. x perceived deviation   -0.688 
   (-0.073) 
Environmental attitude   0.199*** 
   (0.293) 
Knowledge   0.132* 
   (0.093) 
Constant 1.84*** 1.65*** 0.845*** 
Observations 685 628 577 
R2 0.021 0.092 0.193 
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Supplementary Table 4-A. Linear regressions of yesterday’s temperature on belief in 
global warming in Study 3b. Note: Standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. 
Sample size is smaller for some regressions due to incomplete responses. * < .10, ** < 
.05, *** < .01. 
 
 
Model 1 2 
Perceived deviation -0.026 -0.059 
 (-0.024) (-0.055) 
Actual temperature (today)  0.088 
  (0.886) 
Actual deviation (today)  -0.092 
  (-0.553) 
Actual temperature (yesterday)  -0.101 
  (-0.780) 
Actual deviation (yesterday)  0.087 
  (0.492) 
Female  0.186 
  (0.109) 
Education  -0.025 
  (-0.034) 
Age  -0.004 
  (-0.048) 
Democrat (relative to Other)  0.511*** 
  (0.298) 
Income (thousands)  -0.009 
  (-0.022) 
Constant 3.179*** 4.071*** 
Observations 250 208 
R2 0.001 0.131 
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Supplementary Table 4-B. Linear regressions of yesterday’s temperature on concern in 
global warming in Study 3b. Note: Standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. 
Sample size is smaller for some regressions due to incomplete responses. * < .10, ** < 
.05, *** < .01. 
 
Model 1 2 
Perceived deviation 0.091 0.034 
 (0.082) (0.031) 
Actual temperature (today)  0.042 
  (0.415) 
Actual deviation (today)  -0.057 
  (-0.334) 
Actual temperature (yesterday)  -0.045 
  (-0.339) 
Actual deviation (yesterday)  0.045 
  (0.248) 
Female  0.067 
  (0.38) 
Education  -0.096* 
  (-0.123) 
Age  -0.006 
  (-0.065) 
Democrat (relative to Other)  0.436*** 
  (0.246) 
Income (thousands)  0.003 
  (0.008) 
Constant 2.049*** 2.716*** 
Observations 250 208 
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Supplementary Methods 
 
Study 2 Passages 
 
Instructions. We are conducting a survey to determine the best way to present scientific 
information to the general public. Our goal is to explain terms simply and clearly so 
people can fully understand them. On the next page, we will ask you to carefully read 
several paragraphs, which describe some scientific terms. You will then be asked 
questions about what you have read. 
Information Condition: What is the difference between weather and climate? In most 
places, weather can change from minute-to-minute, day-to-day, and season-to-season. 
Climate, however, is the average of weather over time and space. An easy way to 
remember the difference is that climate is what you expect, like a hot summer, and 
weather is what you get, like a hot day with thunderstorms. We talk about climate change 
in terms of years, decades or even centuries. Weather is the combination of temperature, 
humidity, cloudiness, and wind in one day while climate is the weather of a location 
averaged over some period (usually 30 years). 
(http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/noaa-n/climate/climate_weather.html) 
 
No-Information Condition: What is REM sleep? REM stands for rapid eye movement 
sleep, and is one stage of sleep that most people go through each night. When we switch 
into REM sleep, our breathing becomes more rapid, and our heart rate increases. Also 
during REM sleep, our eyes move quickly in various directions, which is what gave this 
stage its name. Interestingly, it is during REM sleep that a person will dream. The first 
REM sleep period usually occurs about 70 to 90 minutes after we first fall asleep. 




Study 3a Scrambled-sentences Text 
 
Heat Prime Cold Prime Neutral Prime 
boils eggs she the of freezes leftovers she the of ball the sudden toss once 
fleas ago cat had the fleas ago cat had the fleas ago cat had the 
his was sunburn painful although his was frostbite painful although was letter she a wrote  
walk for go path a walk for go path a walk for go path a 
had hot felt water the had cold felt water the dinner were dog ate the 
new was gave movie the new was gave movie the new was gave movie the 
saw over train he the saw over train he the saw over train he the 
should the burning was tree lake the frozen was should played there band music the 
ball the sudden toss once ball the sudden toss once ball the sudden toss once 
The sweats man old of the shivers man old of heard should the he phone 
curtain green how was the curtain green how was the curtain green how was the 
glove gone she a found glove gone she a found glove gone she a found 
potatoes she the roasted it meat she the defrosted it a should wrote a he letter  
	  
 
Actual Temperature Data Collection Methods 
Temperature data were accessed using the ASOS (Automated Surface Observing 
Systems) system, which includes approximately 2,000 weather stations located at airports 
across the country. The ASOS program is a joint effort of the National Weather Service, 
the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of Defense. The ASOS weather 
stations are the United State's primary surface weather observing network used by NOAA 
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(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). 
(http://www.nws.noaa.gov/ost/asostech.html).  
Participants’ ZIP codes were used to specify the location for each query in order 
to generate actual and historical temperatures for the day that participants participated in 
our study. The Weather API returned the temperature data from the National Weather 
Service ASOS weather station nearest to each zip code. Temperature data were accessed 
through the Weather API maintained by Weather Underground, Inc. 
(http://www.wunderground.com/weather/api). We used the Weather API to access the 
daily high and low temperatures for the date and location each participant took the survey 
(midpoints were calculated directly from these values). Average temperatures were 
calculated by taking the midpoint of the high and low temperatures, and objective 
deviations were calculated by taking the difference between that day’s average and the 
historical average. To generate the historical averages, we queried the daily high and low 
temperatures for the same calendar day on each of the 15 years prior to the date the 
survey was taken. Ninety-five percent of the cases have two or less years of historical 
data missing. The mean number of years of historical data missing is .53. For cases 
where years of historical data missing totaled seven or more (1.5% of cases), we deemed 
the historical averages unusable and treated them as missing data.  
U.S. temperatures during Study 1 averaged 75.8 degrees Fahrenheit (sd = 10.9) 
with a mean deviation of 1.1 degrees (sd = 5.2). During Study 2, temperatures averaged 
51.2 degrees (sd = 9.1) with a mean deviation of  -1.0 degrees (sd = 4.9).  U.S 
temperatures during Study 3a averaged 65.6 degrees (sd = 14.4) with a mean deviation of 
2.58 degrees (sd = 5.2), whereas Study 3b averaged 66.9 degrees Fahrenheit (sd = 8.82), 
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with a mean deviation of 3.81 degrees (sd = 4.7).  Finally, in Study 4, which was 
conducted over the summer, temperatures averaged 78.5 (sd = 11.6) degrees with a mean 
deviation of 4.11 degrees (sd = 5.1) 
 
Supplementary Analyses 
Instrumental Variable Regression 
To control for reverse causation and omitted variable biases, we employ 
instrumental variable regressions, a technique widely used in economics to help establish 
causality in observational data when randomized experiments are not possible (Angrist & 
Krueger, 2001; Sargan, 1958). This was the analysis employed by Li, Johnson and Zaval 
(2011) to causally link perceived abnormalities in current temperature with changes in 
belief in global warming. The idea is to model the purported causal variable (global 
warming attitude) using a third variable that is related to but not possibly caused by it. In 
our case, we can use objective temperature measures as instrumental variables for the 
perceived deviation from usual temperature and perform two-stage least squares 
regressions. We reason that although actual temperature deviations can affect perceived 
deviations, the reverse case—that peoples’ beliefs influence actual temperature—cannot 
be true. 
Using data from the GW Frame in Study 1, and using actual temperature 
deviation from the historical average as an instrumental variable for perceived 
temperature deviation, we establish that perceived deviation has a direct causal link to 
global warming attitudes, and this analysis weakens the possibility of any 3rd omitted 
variable producing the result. 
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We used actual temperature deviation from the historical average (T) as an 
instrumental variable for perceived temperature deviation. Estimates for instrumental 
variables were calculated using two-stage least squares regression. The first-stage 
regression used actual temperature deviation to generate predicted values of perceived 
deviation (ŶP). These predicted values of perceived deviations, which were free of any 
effects of global warming attitude, were then used to estimate effects on global warming 
attitudes (A).  In other words, P was regressed on T, which generated ŶP; we then ran 
regressions estimating A as a function of ŶP.  We find that actual deviation was 
correlated with perceived deviation (r = .24, p < .01), as well as concern about global 
warming (r = .14, p < .01). The variance estimator used the original endogenous 
regressor to construct residuals and not the first-stage fitted values. The F statistic from 
the first-stage regression was 21.17 and was therefore strong enough to yield results that 
are substantially less biased than OLS. The second stage regression confirmed our central 
result: The predicted values of perceived deviation obtained from the first-stage 
regression had significant effects on concern for global warming (β = .57, t(343) = 2.60, p 
= .02). Because the predictor was a function of only objective temperature deviation, this 
analysis should eliminate the concern about reverse causality and omitted variable biases 
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001).  We also conducted an analysis in which we interact ŶP with 
framing condition (Warming vs. Change) to test this regression coefficient for statistical 
significance. As expected, there was no significant interaction between the predicted 
values of perceived deviation and framing condition. This result remained the same in the 
presence of demographic controls.   
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We ran similar analyses for Studies 2, 3b and 4.2 For	  Study	  3b,	  yesterday’s 
deviation from the historical average was used as an instrument for yesterday’s perceived 
temperature.	  The	  F statistic from the first-stage regression was 13.91. As expected, the 
predicted values of yesterday’s perceived deviation obtained from the first-stage 
regression did not have significant effects on either belief or concern in global warming 
(p = .51, .45). In Study 4, the F statistic from the first-stage regression was 121.6. The 
predicted values of perceived deviation obtained from the first-stage regression had 
significant effects on belief in global warming (β = .21, t(321) = 2.52, p = .01). We also 
used predicted values of perceived deviations to estimate effects on PDW (percentage 
days warmer) as the dependent variable. Consistent with our hypothesis, the predicted 
values of today’s perceived deviation obtained from the first-stage regression also had 













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  We recognize that a reliable implementation of an IV must utilize a sufficient sample size to allow for 
reasonable estimation of the treatment effect. This assumption may not be satisfied in Study 2 (in the 
knowledge condition): The effect of the predicted values of perceived deviation obtained from the first-
stage regression on belief in global warming did not reach significance, though the direction was similar (t 
= 1.2, p = ns). Though we expect direction in all of these studies, it is unlikely that reverse causality 
operates in some studies but not others, given that these are replicating the same paradigm.	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Abstract	  
Long time horizons and social distance are often viewed as key barriers to pro-
environmental action due to intertemporal and interpersonal discounting, particularly in 
the case of climate change. We suggest that these challenges can be turned into 
opportunities by making salient relevant long-term goals and motives, thus shifting 
preferences for present-future and self-other trade-offs at the point of decision-making. 
Here we test whether individuals’ latent motivation to leave a positive legacy can be 
leveraged to increase engagement with climate change and other long-term 
environmental problems. In an initial study, we find that individual differences in legacy 
motivation are positively associated with pro-environmental behaviors and intentions. In 
a second study, we demonstrate that priming legacy motives prior to providing an 
opportunity to donate to an environmental charity increases donations, as well as self-
reported pro-environmental intentions and beliefs. Using a new short-form scale designed 
to measure legacy motives, we confirm that changes in environmental behavior and belief 
induced by the legacy prime are mediated by increased concern for one’s future legacy. 
This work provides the first experimental evidence that domain-general legacy motives 
can be exploited to support intergenerational environmental stewardship, and represents a 
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How will I be remembered? Conserving the environment for legacy’s sake 
The U.S public consistently ranks climate change as a low national priority 
(Leiserowitz, 2006), resulting in mitigation and adaptation efforts that most climate 
scientists and environmental economists find woefully insufficient (Solomon et al., 2007; 
Stocker, 2013). This underinvestment in the future is due, in part, to a perceived sense of 
temporal and social distance from the most severe likely consequences of climate change 
(which will be felt by individuals living far away in time and space). This sense of 
distance can act as a psychological barrier to environmental action by promoting 
intertemporal and interpersonal discounting (Gifford, 2011; Markowitz & Shariff, 2012; 
Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012; Weber & Stern, 2011). Yet it is exactly the long 
time-frame and strong path dependencies inherent in climate change that makes taking 
action in the present so critical (Solomon et al., 2007).   
Emerging research, however, indicates that people’s latent motivation to extend 
themselves into the future via their personal legacies may provide a pathway to 
overcoming such psychological barriers to pro-social, intergenerational action (Fox, Tost, 
& Wade-Benzoni, 2010; Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez, & Larrick, 2012).  Interest in 
passing along knowledge, skills and resources to future others may play a key role in 
motivating protective and preemptive action on long-term environmental threats, which 
involves making present sacrifices and investments in order to secure a stable, flourishing 
world for future. Such interest can take multiple forms, including the multidimensional 
aspiration to leave a positive legacy (Hunter & Rowles, 2005; McAdams & Logan, 
2004). In economic terms, a commitment to legacy goals may be expressed as reduced 
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discount rates, with lower discount rates implicitly putting greater value on current 
investments in sustainability for future generations.  
We propose that legacy motivations may represent a previously under-studied and 
powerful mechanism by which to circumvent the otherwise detrimental psychological 
barriers (e.g., intertemporal distance and discounting) that inhibit preventive action on 
climate change. To date, no published work has systematically examined the link 
between legacy motives and climate change engagement, nor determined whether 
increasing the salience of such motives can increase action on climate change. Our 
predictions are grounded in existing correlational data, which show a positive relationship 
between concern for future generations and pro-environmental attitudes (Matsuba et al., 
2012; Milfont, Harré, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2012; Van Winden, Van den Berg, & Pol, 
2007).  For example, Urien and Kilbourne (2011) reported that generative concern, a 
component of legacy motivation (Newton, Herr, Pollack, & McAdams, 2013), was 
positively related to environmentally friendly behaviors and purchasing eco-friendly 
products.  Moreover, recent research has proposed the concept of environmental 
generativity to describe the positive relationship between concern for future generations 
and self reported ecological behavior (Milfont et al., 2012). However, in contrast to the 
concept of altruistic generativity (Erikson, 1963), legacy motives are grounded in 
processes through which both the individual and recipients of generative or legacy-
building actions may benefit (Newton et al., 2013).  
The present work builds on emerging decision-making research, which suggests 
that attitudes and behavioral responses towards climate change are malleable and 
influenced by psychological factors (Hershfield, Bang, & Weber, 2014; Li et al., 2011; 
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Weber & Johnson, 2009; Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014). Although there are 
multiple routes to increasing willingness to take action on behalf of future others, we 
predict that leveraging and making salient individuals’ concern for their own legacy 
represents a potentially powerful strategy for increasing action on climate change. We 
conducted two internet-based studies to test this claim. In the first, we confirmed the 
relationship between domain-general legacy motives and pro-environmental behavior. In 
the second, we used a novel legacy prime to experimentally manipulate the salience of 
legacy motives, and examined subsequent effects on pro-environmental beliefs, 
intentions, and actual mitigation behavior.  
STUDY 1 
Method 
 In Study 1, a diverse sample of 245 U.S participants, recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester et al., 2011), elected to participate in an online study 
advertised as a survey on how people make decisions. All participants had a 97% or 
higher approval rating according to the screening procedures of this site. These panels 
represent a wide range of socioeconomic factors not seen in university lab settings (see 
Table S1 in Supplementary Material available online for demographic details for both 
studies). 
 To test individual differences in legacy motives, we created a single composite 
measure of eight items (α = .90), which were modified from the Loyola Generativity 
Scale (LGS; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992).  The creation of this novel scale was 
explicitly focused on one’s reputation in the eyes of future generations (Detailed 
information about the question items and scales are available in the Supplementary 
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Materials).  
 Participants next answered two sets of questions, one assessing their beliefs about 
climate change and the other their willingness to take pro-environmental action. Climate 
change beliefs were measured using the average score of five randomly ordered items (α 
= .88), including, “I feel a responsibility to reduce my personal contribution to climate 
change”.  Participants responded to each statement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Similarly, pro-environmental behavioral 
intentions were measured using the average score of six items that asked participants how 
often they intend to perform a series of mitigation actions over the next month (α = .76), 
including, “Buy green products instead of regular products” (1= never, 6 = all the time). 
Following the legacy, belief and intention ratings, we gave participants the option of 
donating part of a $10 bonus, as determined by lottery, to make a real financial donation 
to a nonprofit environmental advocacy organization, Trees for the Future. Participants 
typed in the amount they would donate, from $0 to $10. Donations were actually given to 
the organization.  All studies were approved by Columbia University’s Institutional 
Review Board.  
 
Results  
Figure 1 plots the relationship between legacy scores and our three measures of 
environmental engagement. People who reported being highly motivated by legacy 
motives were more likely to show heightened levels of pro-environmental beliefs and 
behavioral intent compared to those who were not motivated by legacy goals. Simple 
linear regressions showed a significant positive relationship between legacy motives and 
both belief, β = 0.13, t(238) = 2.08, p = .038, and behavioral intention, β = 0.29, t(239) = 
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4.69, p < .001. Additional regressions revealed the robustness of these relations when 
controlling for demographics, including political affiliation and parental status (see the 
Supplemental Materials). Although party affiliation, income, and parental status had 
significant effects on climate change behavioral intentions, legacy motives remained 
highly significant in the presence of these controls. In fact, legacy motives alone 
accounted for a greater proportion of the variance in behavioral intention compared to 
whether or not someone identified politically as a Democrat versus Independent or 
Republican (8.1% vs. 2.8%).  
Participants higher in Legacy motives also donated a larger amount of their bonus 
money to the environmental non-profit organization than those lower in legacy motives, 
β = 0.23, t(241) = 3.73, p < .001. Participants in the bottom quartile of legacy motives 
donated an average of $1.75 (SD = $2.21; 22% donated) whereas those in the top quartile 
donated an average of $3.41 (SD = $2.87; 31% donated).  The role of legacy on donations 
remained robust after controlling for demographics, political affiliation and parental 
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Fig. 1. Results from Study 1: regression plots (and 95% confidence bands) showing the 
relationship between climate change belief, behavioral intention and amount of donations 
to charity as a function of legacy motives. [COLOR FIGURE] 
STUDY 2 
Study 1 demonstrated a robust relationship between legacy motives and people’s 
willingness to engage in behaviors aimed at combating climate change. To investigate 
whether legacy motives can be leveraged as a tool for promoting action on climate 
change, and to clarify the causal direction of this observed relationship, we tested 
whether priming legacy motives positively influences participants’ level of 
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accessibility or salience of legacy motives prior to administering the scales described 
above. Specifically, we test whether priming legacy motives using an essay-writing task 
positively influences participants’ pro-environmental beliefs, intentions and behavior. We 
hypothesized that participants exposed to a legacy motive-inducing prime would show 
enhanced environmental engagement compared to those in a control condition. 
Methods 
In Study 2, 312 U.S. participants who did not complete Study 1were recruited via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in an online study advertised as a study on 
decision-making. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the 
Legacy condition, participants were asked to write a short essay describing what they 
want to be remembered for by future generations.3 The instructions asked participants to 
think about ways in which they would have a positive impact on future generations, (e.g. 
“think about skills or knowledge you will teach others”). Essay completion took 6.5 
minutes on average. The legacy essay was omitted in the Control condition. Next, all 
participants completed a battery of questions measuring climate change beliefs, 
behavioral intentions, and financial donation as in Study 1. (Detailed information about 
all question items and scales used in Study 2 are available in the Supplementary 
Materials).  
Measure of mediator 
To test the proposed underlying mechanism that increased concern for one’s 
legacy mediates legacy prime-induced changes in climate change attitudes and actions, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  We piloted the Legacy priming manipulation in a separate experiment confirming that the essay 
writing exercise significantly increased reported legacy motives. We determined sample size for 
Study 2 based on results of the pilot, which suggested a small to medium effect size.	  
	   51	  
we constructed a new short-form scale that uniquely taps into people’s legacy motives. 
Using the Loyola Generativity Scale (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992) as a model, we 
constructed a measure of legacy motives that was explicitly focused on one’s future 
legacy and reputation in the eyes of future generations, excluding generative motives 
(such as the desire to pass skills and knowledge to future generations). This measure 
consisted of the average score of three items relating to legacy (α = .82): (1) “It is 
important to me to leave a positive legacy”, (2) It is important for me to leave a positive 
mark on society”, and “I care about what future generations think of me.” Participants 
indicated the extent to which each statement described them (1= not at all, 6 = a great 
amount). This legacy motives scale was placed at the end of the survey, which was 
separated from the essay task by 8 minutes on average. We predicted that participants 
exposed to the prime would show higher agreement with these items, and further, that 
this measure would mediate the effect of the essay prime on the dependent variables. 
Additional items tapping into more generalized pro-social motives were also included at 
the end of the survey, but were not expected to mediate the effect of the prime on the 
environmental outcomes of interest.  
Results  
As expected, the essay manipulation worked successfully to enhance overall 
levels of legacy motives. Almost ten minutes after being exposed to the manipulation, 
participants who wrote the essay reported higher legacy motives (M = 4.47, SD = 1.06) 
compared with those in the control condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.05), F(1, 310) = 5.64, p = 
.018; Cohen’s d = .27. Moreover, as predicted, we found a significant effect of the legacy 
prime on willingness to engage in behaviors aimed at combating climate change. 
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Participants who were primed with legacy motives reported higher belief scores (M = 
5.39, SD = 1.08) than those in a control condition (M = 5.11, SD = 1.27), F(1, 309)= 4.08, 
p = .040, d = .23. We also found a significant effect of the legacy prime on behavioral 
intentions. Participants who were primed reported higher levels of behavioral intention 
(M = 3.05, SD = .86) than those who were not primed  (M = 2.73, SD = .85), F(1, 309) = 
10.07, p = .002, d = .36 (See Figure 2). 
To confirm that the influence of the prime on climate change attitudes was driven 
by increases in legacy motives, we conducted a mediation analysis using the mean legacy 
motives score as a mediator. As shown in Figure 3, the effect of essay priming on 
individuals’ climate change belief was fully mediated by increases in legacy motives:  
Priming condition, direct: t(308) = 2.01, priming condition, mediated: t(308) = 1.29, 
Sobel’s Z = 2.19, p = .028. Mediation was also confirmed by a bias-corrected 
bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; see Supplementary Materials). Based 
on 5000 bootstrapped samples, the indirect effect of the legacy induction on climate 
change beliefs through legacy concern was significant, with a 95% confidence interval 
excluding zero (β= .041, CI95 [0.01-0.09], p = .029). Behavioral intentions were also 
partially mediated by increases in legacy motives: Priming condition, direct: t(311) = 
3.17, priming condition, mediated: t(311) = 2.65, Sobel’s Z = 2.11, p = .034; the indirect 
effect of the legacy induction on behavioral intent through legacy motives was significant 
(β = .034, CI95 [0.01-0.08], p = .035).  
Results for our donation measure were consistent with the self-report results. As 
Figure 2 demonstrates, participants who were primed with legacy motives donated 
significantly more of their earnings to an environmental organization than those who 
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were placed in the control condition F(1, 310) = 8.79, p = .003, d = .34. Those who were 
not primed donated an average of $2.31 (SD = $2.74; 61% donated), whereas those who 
were primed donated an average of $3.34 (SD = $3.29, 70% donated). The differences 
remained significant when we examined the square root transformed values of the 
donation amounts in order to account for the negatively skewed distribution, β = 0.15, 
t(310) = 2.74, p = .007.  Based on 5000 bootstrapped samples, we found marginally 
significant evidence of partial mediation through legacy concern, β = .015, CI95 [0.001-
0.045], Sobel’s Z = 1.52, p = .13. As in Study 1, we conducted additional analyses that 
revealed the robustness of these effects when controlling for demographics, political 
affiliation and general environmental attitude. 
 
Fig. 2. Effect of legacy prime on climate change behavioral intention (panel a) and 
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Fig. 3. Mediation Analysis (Study 2). Legacy prime-induced changes in climate change 
belief are mediated by increased legacy motives. β = standardized coefficients 
 *< .05, **< .01, ***< .001. 
General Discussion 
 Over the past several years, researchers and policymakers have begun to 
recognize that psychological obstacles to climate change mitigation need to be addressed 
in order to foster progress on this important topic. In the studies reported here, we find 
that people’s attitudes and mitigation behaviors towards climate change are related to 
their generalized motivation to leave behind a positive legacy for future generations, and 
that differences in legacy motives are related to consequential environmental charitable 
giving. The present results also provide the first experimental demonstration that 
increasing the salience of legacy motives can increase people’s desire to engage in 
environmental sustainability.  
! = .12* / ! = .07!!!
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 Environmental protection requires individuals to consider time frames well 
beyond their own life spans. Often, the long time horizons involved in environmental 
conservation are viewed by issue advocates, policymakers and researchers as barriers to 
mitigation, due in part to intertemporal and interpersonal discounting (Gifford, 2011; 
Markowitz & Shariff, 2012; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Weber & Stern, 2011). In stark 
contrast with this view, we demonstrate that this fundamental feature of environmental 
problems can, under certain conditions, be leveraged to promote rather than inhibit 
environmental engagement. Specifically, when people’s latent motivation to leave behind 
a positive legacy is made salient just prior to making a present-self versus future-other 
trade-off, behavior shifts towards favoring the well-being of future others, as predicted. 
Our work demonstrates that legacy motives matter deeply for pro-environmental 
action, which often involves making trade-offs between current consumption and future 
well-being. Moreover, climate change mitigation and adaptation behaviors serve as 
potentially powerful outlets for expressing legacy motives. Importantly, our work has the 
potential to aid the development and implementation of effective strategies to support 
conservation efforts, particularly with respect to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. This is critical, as policymakers and advocates continue to grapple with the 
question of how to increase citizen engagement with climate change (e.g., Moser & 
Dilling, 2011). For instance, the Alliance for Climate Protection, has spent $300 million 
in campaign efforts to change public perception (Revkin, 2008). To achieve meaningful 
global emissions reductions in time to avoid dangerous interference with the climate 
system (Solomon et al., 2007), new forms of discourse to support sustainability efforts 
will be required (Bandura, 2007). Our results suggest that public policies that make 
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individuals’ legacy motives salient may be effective in encouraging environmentally and 
ecologically sustainable behaviors. Prompts that encourage people to think about how 
they would want to be remembered (or perhaps what they don’t want to be remembered 
for) may effectively promote environmental behavior by framing decisions as “win-win” 
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(N = 245) 
Study 2 
(N = 312) 
Sex, %   
    Males 52 54 
    Females 47 46 
Age, M (SD) 35.9 (12.7) 34.3 (12.1) 
Education, % 83 85 
Race/ethnicity, %   
    White 82 80 
Parental Status %   
    Parent 27 38 
    Non-Parent 73 62 
Polit. Affiliation, %   
    Democrat 38 39 
    Republican 15 13 
   Independent/Other 47 42 
	  
Due to some participants choosing not to answer, the race/ethnicity, political affiliation 
columns do not total to 100. 
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Supplementary Table 2-A. Linear regressions of Legacy Motivation on Behavioral 
Intent Score in Study1. Note: Standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. Sample 
size is smaller for some regressions due to incomplete responses. * < .10, ** < .05, *** < 
.01. 
Model 1 2 
Legacy Score 0.320 *** 0.275 *** 
  (0.250) 
Female  0.014  
  (0.007) 
Democrat (relative to 
Other) 
 0.362 *** 
  (0.167) 
Income (thousands)  -0.081* 
  (-0.120) 
Parent  -0.416 *** 
  (-0.176) 
Education  0.096 
  (0.089) 
Constant  2.46 *** 
Observations 239 234 
R2 0.081 0.152 
 
Supplementary Table 2-B. Linear regressions of Legacy Motivation on Donation ($) in 
Study 1. Note: Standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. Sample size is smaller 
for some regressions due to incomplete responses. * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .01. 
Model 1 2 
Legacy Score 0.730 *** 0.441 ** 
 (0.234) (0.141) 
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Female  0.458 
  (0.084) 
Democrat (relative to Other)  0.074 
  (0.012) 
Income (thousands)  0.072 
  (0.038) 
Parent  -1.880 *** 
  (-0.281) 
Education  0.428 ** 
  (0.141) 
Constant -0.332 2.20 * 
Observations 241 236 
R2 0.050 0.140 
 
Supplementary Table 3. Linear regressions of Generative Prime on Behavioral 
Intention Score in Study 2. Note: Standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. 
Sample size is smaller for some regressions due to incomplete responses. * < .10, ** < 
.05, *** < .01. 
Model 1 2 
Essay Prime 0.309 *** 0.271 *** 
 (0.178) (0.155) 
Female  0.252 ** 
  (0.144) 
Age  .007 
  (0.103) 
Republican (relative to 
Other) 
 -0.266 * 
  (-0.101) 
Income (thousands)  -0.019 
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  (-0.035) 
Education  0.001 
  (0.001) 
Parent  -0.114 
  (-0.063) 
Constant 3.179 *** 2.51 *** 
Observations 309 303 
R2 0.031 0.075 
 
 
Test of Mediation 
 
In addition to reporting results for normal theory tests, we also tested mediation using the 
Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapping method, which generates a data driven 
sampling distribution that can be used to robustly estimate the significance of the indirect 
effect (macrocode available at http://www.quantpsy.org). In the present set of analyses, 
parameter estimates were based on a resample procedure of 5,000 bootstrap samples (bias 
corrected and accelerated estimates and 95% CI).  
Preacher, K.J. & Hayes, A.F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing 
and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavioral Research 
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Supplementary Methods 
 
Study 1 Legacy Motive Question Items: 
 
Instructions: Please read each of the statements below carefully. Then select the answer 
choice indicating the extent to which each statement describes you. Please be as honest 
and accurate as you can be. 
Scale: 1 (Not at all); 2 (Not very much); 3 (A little bit); 4 (Somewhat); 5 (A good deal); 6 
(A great amount)  
 
1. I care about what future generations think of me 
2. I have important skills I can pass along to others 
3. I am good at many things 
4. I feel a connection to future generations 
5. I am well liked by my friends 
6. Others would say that I have made unique contributions to my community or 
society 
7. It is important to me to leave a positive legacy 
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Behavioral Intention Question Items: 
 
Instructions: Please indicate how often you intend to perform the following 
behaviors over the next three months:  
Scale: 1 (Never); 2 (Very Infrequently); 3 (Once in a while); 4 (Sometimes); 5 (Often); 6 
(All the time)  
 
1. Take showers that are 5 minutes or less 
2. Use public transportation or carpool 
3. Unplug appliances and chargers (e.g., TV, cell phone, computer) at night 
4. Buy green products instead of regular products (e.g., dishwashing detergent), even 
 
What do you want to be remembered for? 
For this writing task, we would like you to think about what you want future 
generations to remember you for when you're gone. In answering this question, 
you might think about ways in which you will have a positive impact on other 
people, skills or knowledge you will teach others, or aspects of your personality 
that you would like to be remembered for. In the space below, please write a 
brief essay describing your response to this question and try to be as honest as 
you can be. 
This essay should take you approximately 5-7 minutes to complete (roughly half 
a page). 
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though they cost more 
5. Attend rallies, public events or town hall meetings to voice my support for solving 
environmental problems 
6. Write letters, email, phone or otherwise contact elected official to urge them to 
take action on environmental issues (e.g., habitat loss, air pollution) 
 
Environmental Attitude Question Items: 
 
Instructions: We'll next ask a few questions about your attitudes regarding environmental 
issues. There are no right or wrong answers--we just want to hear what you think. 
 
Scale: 1 (Strongly Disagree) – 7 (Strongly Agree)  
 
1. I feel a responsibility to reduce my personal contribution to climate change. 
2. I feel that it is important to maintain the environment for future generations. 
3. I am in favor of national policies and regulations that decrease fossil fuel burning, 
even if they increase energy and electricity costs today. 
4. The so-called “global warming crisis” facing humankind has been greatly 
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Donation Question Wording: 
  
The organization you have an opportunity to donate to today is called Trees for 
the Future, whose motto is "Plant trees. Change Lives." Since 1989, Trees for the Future 
has helped communities in 19 countries around the world plant millions of trees. Their 
work has and will continue to improve the well-being of children and families for 
generations to come, by cleaning the air, reducing risks from landslides and reducing 
deforestation. If you'd like to learn more about the organization, their website 
is: http://www.treesforthefuture.org 
Please note that the total amount must add up to exactly $10. Remember that you 
will be paid your MTurk compensation regardless of whether you win the lottery or not. 
 Donate                    ____ 
 Keep for myself     ____ 
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Effects of Age on Affective Forecasting Ability 
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Abstract  
Previous research on age differences in affective forecasting focused on identifying 
inaccuracies rather than the process in which forecasts are constructed. Based on a dual-
system framework of decision-making, the present research examines under what 
situations age differences in affective forecasting emerge, and what underlying 
mechanism may account for these differences. Experiment 1 compared affective 
forecasting and experienced affect in younger and older adults under differential 
involvement of affective versus deliberative processes using the Columbia Card Task. 
Younger adults made more extreme forecasts than older adults, and exhibited greater 
forecasting accuracy for gain outcomes in the affective version of the task, but not for 
losses. Age did not affect accuracy of forecasting in the deliberative version of the task. 
Experiment 2 examined whether age differences in affective forecasting ability extend to 
long-term forecasting errors routed in temporal discounting behavior. In a continuous age 
sample, younger adults exhibited greater future anhedonia errors, mistakenly believing 
that they would experience less intense affect when an event happened in the future than 
when the same event happened in the present. These forecasting errors were also found to 
mediate the effect of age on time preference. Taken together, our findings suggest that 
affective forecasting is a skill that may improve across the lifespan, and thus may tap 
cognitive and affective abilities that increase with the experience that comes with age, 
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Effects of age on affective forecasting ability 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Decisions involving long time horizons often involve making predictions about 
future outcomes and preferences, which in turn may or may not coincide with 
experienced outcomes (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). However, relatively 
little research has explored how individual and situational differences might affect the 
match or mismatch between the two. Affective forecasting examines the accuracy of 
people’s expectations regarding their future emotional states (Loewenstein & Lerner, 
2003; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), and may depend on key contextual variables that 
influence preferences and attitudes, including the decision context (i.e., affective versus 
deliberative decision environments), and various individual differences (i.e., age and 
level of experience).  
Indeed, affective forecasting ability may have particular practical relevance in 
advanced age. In the domain of financial decision-making, in particular, older adults must 
often make predictions about their future preferences and affective reactions to potential 
outcomes, including investment of savings and retirement income (Hershey, Jacobs-
Lawson, McArdle, & Hamagami, 2007), health care planning (Anderson, 2007), 
insurance purchases (Frolik, 2009), and anticipating long-term care needs (Sörensen, 
Mak, & Pinquart, 2011).   However, there has been relatively little empirical research on 
affective forecasting ability in older adults, and the few studies that have examined this 
topic lack consensus, compelling further investigation (Scheibe, Mata, & Carstensen, 
2011). More importantly, the little research that has examined age differences in affective 
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forecasting has focused on identifying forecasting inaccuracies, but neglected to study the 
processes by which forecasts are constructed.  
The present research attempts to address this knowledge gap by examining under 
what situations age differences in affective forecasting emerge, and what underlying 
mechanism may account for these differences. First, based on a dual-system framework 
of decision-making (Weber & Johnson, 2009) and documented age differences in 
emotional processing (Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010), we consider the role of “hot 
processes” in decision-behavior by examining whether age differences in affective 
forecasts, made in a deliberative state, differ with those made during an emotionally 
charged state. We next consider whether age differences in long-term affective forecasts 
are related to time preference, another decision-making behavior governed by dual-
systems (Laibson, 1997a). Overall, we predicted that advanced age, because it is 
associated with improved emotional regulation and reduced temporal discounting, would 
be associated with reduced affective forecasting errors, but only in tasks that drive affect-
based strategy use. To provide the theoretical background for our predictions, we first 
review the literature on decision-making and emotional changes across adulthood, and 
then consider the possible implications for age-differences in affective forecasting. 
1.1 Affective Forecasting 
 
 Everyday forecasting requires balancing hedonic impulses with deliberate long-
term evaluations, in order to choose an option that will ultimately provide the greatest 
hedonic benefits (Loewenstein, 2007). To make these judgments, people must go beyond 
current experience and instead rely on semantic knowledge, including situation-specific 
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beliefs about what emotions are typically elicited in particular situations and the levels 
and kinds of emotions generally experienced (Robinson & Clore, 2002).  
Research on affective forecasting, however, has consistently demonstrated that 
individuals make inaccurate forecasts concerning the intensity and duration of their 
affective responses (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). For example, people tend to overestimate 
affective reactions to future events and decisions, a source of error termed the “impact 
bias” (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). When people generate forecasts regarding a future event, 
the target event becomes the focus of judgment, and consequently, people may fail to 
consider the extent to which other, peripheral events influence their emotional responses 
(Kermer, Driver, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). To overcome 
these errors, people must correctly identify when they have experienced a comparable 
event in their past, (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), an ability which may improve with 
accumulated life experience and greater emotional knowledge.  Indeed, evidence suggests 
that people who have experience in a particular situation make more accurate forecasts 
concerning adaptation (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). 
A second type of forecasting error, consistent with research on temporal 
discounting, reveals that people falsely assume that they will experience less intense 
affect when an event happens in the future than when the same event happens in the 
present (Kassam, Gilbert, Boston, & Wilson, 2008); a bias termed “future anhedonia”. It 
has been well documented that the temporal location of an event influences the way that 
event is mentally represented (i.e. Trope & Liberman, 2003; Zaval & Gureckis, 2010). As 
a result of these differences, representations of future events tend to evoke less intense 
affect than do representations of present events (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & 
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Cohen, 2004). If people believe that their future emotions will be less intense than their 
present feelings, then time discounting may reflect their attempt to maximize benefits by 
enjoying them in the present. A body of work suggests that affective factors play a major 
role in temporal discounting behavior, and age differences in affective forecasting and 
future anhedonia would therefore seem to have important implications in this domain 
(Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2011; Lerner, Li, & Weber, 2013; Löckenhoff, O'Donoghue, & 
Dunning, 2011; Pyone & Isen, 2011).  
 
1.2 Aging and Affective Forecasting  
 
Although lifespan differences in affective forecasting have important practical 
implications, evidence regarding age differences in affective forecasting ability is scarce. 
Moreover, the handful of existing studies on this topic focus on identifying inaccuracies 
rather than the process in which forecasts are constructed. For example, in a monetary 
incentive delay task, younger, but not older adults overestimated increases in arousal in 
response to small monetary gain outcomes (Nielsen, Knutson, & Carstensen, 2008). 
Forecasting accuracy was also enhanced with age in a study in which participants 
predicted how they would feel if their preferred presidential candidate won or lost the 
2008 election, particularly among supporters of the winning candidate (Scheibe et al., 
2011). Contrastingly, no age differences in forecasting accuracy were found in a study in 
which old and young adults predicted how satisfied they would feel after choosing among 
everyday products (Kim, Healey, Goldstein, Hasher, & Wiprzycka, 2008). Thus, despite 
the preliminary evidence that older adults more accurately predict dynamic changes in 
affect, the mixed evidence and paucity of studies limit our confidence in these findings. 
Further, prior research failed to distinguish between the role of deliberative and affective 
	   73	  
decision environments on age differences in affective forecasting, which may account for 
previous mixed results, and which we next turn to in more detail. 
1.3 Age, Decision Making, and Affect 
 
Emerging interest in age-related changes in decision making focus on a dual-
process model of decision making (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012; Li, 
Baldassi, Johnson, & Weber, 2013), which distinguishes between affective “hot” 
processing abilities and deliberative “cold” processing (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; 
Sloman, 1996). This work indicates that affective and deliberative processing abilities 
show differential age trajectories (Carstensen, 2006; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & 
Weber, 2009; Peters, Hess, Vaestfjaell, & Auman, 2007), with implicit forms of 
knowledge, such as affect, becoming more important inputs into decisions as deliberative 
processes decline with age (Mather, 2006; Peters, Finucane, MacGregor, & Slovic, 2000; 
Peters et al., 2007). Increased knowledge, life experience, and shifts in emotional goals 
may result in more efficient affective or experiential processing of decision information 
(Peters et al., 2007). Indeed, relying on affective cues has been shown to be beneficial in 
decision-making, as when seniors rely on simpler information search strategies, avoid the 
sunk cost bias, and resist the influence of irrelevant options on choices (Besedeš, Deck, 
Sarangi, & Shor, 2012; Kim & Hasher, 2005; Strough, Mehta, McFall, & Schuller, 2008). 
In these cases, accumulated emotional knowledge and experience may help older adults 
make appropriate decisions in situations of heightened emotional arousal.  
One important way in which people incorporate emotions into their judgments is 
when constructing affective forecasts, and it seems likely that age differences in 
emotional processing would result in qualitative differences in young versus older adults’ 
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forecasting ability.  For example, older adults’ may exhibit an advantage in affective 
forecasting which stems from their ability to identify the specific emotions that arise from 
complex affective experiences (Carstensen et al., 2011; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010). 
Further, age differences in dispositional emotions may reflect the ability to prevent 
emotional factors from intruding into everyday functioning (Löckenhoff et al., 2011). 
Indeed, evidence suggests that older adults’ accumulated experience leads to improved 
emotion regulation and problem solving strategies (Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Grossmann 
et al., 2010; Kafetsios, 2004; Kessler & Staudinger, 2009; Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 
2009), which may confer advantages in down regulating the “hot” system in favor of a 
more deliberative consideration of available trade-offs.  These findings are in line with 
the hypothesis that age differences in affective forecasting may only occur under the 
influence of hot processes in decision behavior. If affect is critical to everyday choice 
processes and if older adults are better at effectively regulating affect, then they may 
make better choices in situations of heightened emotional arousal, despite analytic 
declines.  
1.4 The Present Research 
 
Our research is predicated on past work that distinguishes between deliberative 
and affective processes in age-related changes in decision-making. We first explore the 
hypothesis that older adults make better affective forecasts compared with younger 
adults, but only in affective versus deliberative decision environments. To examine this 
prediction, in Experiment 1, we examine the effect of age on short-term affective 
forecasting ability under differential involvement of affective versus deliberative 
processes using two versions a dynamic decision task. This study specifically focused on 
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the prediction and actual experience of affective states elicited during the anticipation and 
realization of positive and negative outcomes, using a laboratory measure of decision 
making that closely mimics everyday life by the manner in which it factors in reward, 
punishment and risk. Experiment 2 builds upon these results by using a continuous age 
sample to explore the extent to which age-differences in affective forecasting extend to 
long-term affective forecasting biases routed in temporal discounting behavior. 
Specifically, we investigate whether people expect their affective reactions to an event to 
be less intense in the future than in the present, and examine the relationship between this 
bias and age differences in temporal discounting behavior. 
 




In Experiment 1, we considered the potential role of hot processes in decision-
behavior by examining whether age differences in affective forecasts, made in a 
deliberative state, differ with those made during an emotionally charged state. Affective 
forecasting ability was compared in younger and older adults using two versions of the 
Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner, Weber, Mackinlay, & Wilkening, 2009). This task 
was chosen because (1) it has previously proven useful in uncovering differences in risk 
preferences and emotional processing across the life span (Figner et al., 2007), and (2) 
because it exists in two versions that differentially trigger affective versus deliberative 
decision making, thus enabling our investigation of affective forecasting in both affect-
based and deliberative risk-taking environments. Participants anticipated their emotional 
reactions to a range of hypothetical CCT outcome scenarios, and then reported 
experienced reactions while actually playing the CCT. We investigated forecasting errors 
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among young and older participants by comparing both their predicted and experienced 
responses. Overall, we predicted that advanced age, because it is associated with 
improved emotional regulation, would be associated with reduced affective forecasting 





A sample of 164 adults from the US was recruited in two age groups via the 
Columbia University Virtual Lab national panel, and were asked to participate in an 
online laboratory session. Participants were divided into roughly equal sized age groups: 
Eighty-one younger adults aged 18-25 years (M = 21.5, SD = 1.48) and 75 older adults 
aged 60-83 (M = 67.8, SD = 5.0).  To ensure that any differences obtained between 
younger and older adults could not be attributed to age-related cognitive abnormalities, a 
separate sample (n = 57%) of older adults from the CDS participant pool was screened 
using the Telephone Interview of Cognitive Status (TICS), finding 90% of the older 
adults completely non-impaired, 10% ambiguous, and none testing either mildly or 
severely impaired.  Age was positively correlated with years of education (r = .20, p < 
.01) but was not related to level of household income (r = .09, p = ns). Seventy-nine 
percent of the sample was Caucasian, and sixty-eight percent were women (see 
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The CCT is a computer-based task in which participants play multiple trials of a 
card game. The Columbia Card Task exists in two versions: a “Hot” affective, and 
“Cold” deliberative version. In the Hot version, at the beginning of each trial, each 
participant encounters 32 cards presented face down (see Supplementary Figure S1-A for 
card presentation screen). Each card may be either a hidden gain or loss card. Each 
turned-over gain card adds a specified amount to the trial payoff, while each loss card 
subtracts a specified amount. In the present experiment, each CCT round involved 8 loss 
cards (out of 32), with gain cards worth +30 points and loss cards worth -90 points. 
Within each trial, cards can be continually turned over as long as gain cards are 
encountered, and the player can voluntarily end the trial at any point and claim the 
accumulated payoff. However, as soon as a loss card is encountered, the trial terminates, 
and a specified loss amount is deducted from the total payoff. The Hot version of the 
CCT triggers primarily affective processes because players make step-wise decisions 
about card selection and are provided with immediate feedback after each selected card. 
In contrast, in the Cold CCT, participants are only asked to indicate the total number of 
cards that they wish to turn over on a given trial. Decisions are not made incrementally 
and players do not receive feedback regarding their decision until the session is 
completed (See Supplementary Figure S1-B for Cold CCT presentation screen). 
2.2.3 Procedure 
 
Participants were paid $5 dollars for their participation via paypal upon 
completion of the experiment, plus any winnings obtained while playing the CCT. 
Bonuses were determined based on the scores of three randomly selected trials, such that 
individual round performance, and not cumulative performance, was consequential.  
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Participants first performed several CCT practice rounds with feedback, and 
answered a series of task comprehension questions (one-way ANOVAs revealed no 
difference in task comprehension between the two age groups, p < .05). After 
familiarizing themselves with the task contingencies, participants rated anticipatory affect 
by predicting their emotional reactions to hypothetical CCT trial outcomes. Participants 
were asked to imagine playing the CCT and to forecast how they would feel when 
anticipating six outcome types: (1) high loss: lose after selecting 1st or 2nd card; (2) med 
loss: lose after 3rd or 4th card; (3) low loss: lose after 5th card or more; (4) low win: win 
after 1st or 2nd card; (5) med win: win after 3rd or 4th card; (6) high win: win after 5th card 
or more. Ratings were made on 7-point scales (1=very unhappy, 7=very happy) (see 
Supplementary Methods for complete version of forecast rating questionnaire). 
Participants next played eight rounds of both CCT versions (Hot and Cold) in a 
randomized block design, and reported their experienced reactions while actually playing 
the game, after each trial. Draws were rigged such that participants experienced at least 
one of each of the six CCT trial outcome types, with order randomized. 
CCT versions were separated by a set of unrelated questionnaires to minimize 
carryover effects. A manipulation check at the end of the experiment assessed whether 
the Hot and Cold CCT conditions differentially involved affective versus deliberative 
processes. Self–reported affect-based strategy was assessed with the item “I solved the 
task on a gut level,” and deliberative strategy use via the item “I tried to solve the task 
mathematically.” Emotional arousal was assessed with the self-report item, “At times 
when deciding what to do, I felt some excitement,” on a scale from 1-5.  
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2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1 Manipulation Check 
 
The Hot/Cold manipulation check confirmed that the Hot and Cold CCT versions 
differentially involved affective versus deliberative processes. As predicted, we found 
greater affect-based strategy use and emotional arousal in the Hot than in the Cold CCT: 
Gut level, t(324) = -2.79, p < .001; excitement, t(324) = -2.32, p < .001. Deliberative 
strategy use was greater in the Cold than Hot CCT: mathematically, t(324) = 1.85 , p < 
.05, all one-tailed (see Figure 1).  
 
Fig. 1. Self-reported decision strategy items “gut level”, “mathematically” and 
“excitement” differ by Columbia Card Task version (Hot and Cold CCT). Error bars 
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2.3.2 Forecasting Dynamics 
 
 With respect to anticipatory affect dynamics, we predicted that forecasted valence 
would be influenced by CCT version type (Hot versus Cold), and that any potential age 
differences in affective forecasting would be evident only in the Hot CCT version, which 
drives affect-based strategy use. We also assumed that expectations would be influenced 
by the type of CCT trial outcome (i.e., low, medium or high gain or loss), which drives 
anticipatory affect and predisposes expectations in the direction of the explicit stakes. By 
parsing forecasts into hot and cold dimensions, we endeavored to isolate the precise 
conditions of any age differences.  
We first analyzed participants’ predicted affect ratings, which were reported prior 
to playing the CCT. A 6 (trial outcome: low, medium or high loss or gain amount) x 2 
(age: young versus old) mixed-effects ANOVA on forecast ratings for Hot CCT trials 
yielded a significant main effect of trial outcome, confirming that participants expected to 
feel larger increases in positive valence as the magnitude of reward increased, and larger 
increases in negative valence as the magnitude of reward decreased. This main effect was 
qualified by an age by trial outcome type interaction; F(1, 906) = 448.67, p < .001; F(5, 
906) = 5.951, p < .001.  Post-hoc analyses revealed that this interaction was driven by 
whether the trial outcome was in the loss or gain domain. A 2 (loss versus gain) x 2 
(young versus old) mixed-effects ANOVA on affective forecast ratings yielded a 
significant interaction, with younger adults anticipating greater negative valence 
associated with hypothetical loss outcomes, and greater positive valence for gain 
outcomes F(1, 914) = 21.17, p < .001. Younger adults’ loss and gain forecasts were thus 
significantly more distant from neutral (i.e., more polarized) than forecasts made by older 
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adults (see Figure 2; Table 1 panel A). Controlling for baseline affect rating and 
demographic variables (i.e. gender, income) did not change the nature of this result. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Anticipatory affect ratings for Hot CCT trial outcomes among younger and older 
participants, derived from self-report ratings from the affective forecasting survey.  Bars 
denote ±1 SEM. 
For Cold CCT trials, we found no evidence of age differences in affective 
forecasting. A 6 (trial outcome) x 2 (age: young versus old) mixed-effects ANOVA on 
forecast ratings for Cold CCT trials yielded a significant main effect of trial outcome, 
F(1, 906) = 375.3, p < .001; but no other significant main or interaction effects. Most 
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indicating no age differences in absolute levels of affective forecasts for Cold CCT trial 
outcomes. 
 
2.3.3 Experienced Affect and Forecasting Errors 
 
Next, we examined the experienced affect responses that participants reported 
while actually playing the CCT. A 6 (trial outcome type) x 2 (age group: young versus 
old) mixed-effects ANOVA for Hot CCT trials on experienced affect rating yielded a 
significant age by trial outcome type interaction; F(5, 906) = 2.63, p = .023. A one-way 
ANOVA of Hot CCT loss outcomes by age revealed a significant main effect of age; F(1, 
453) = 4.12, p = .042, such that younger adults experienced greater negative affect 
associated with CCT loss outcome trials relative to older adults. However, a significant 
main effect of age did not emerge in the gain domain as in the loss domain; F(1,453) = 
1.28, p = ns. No age differences in experienced affect were found in the Cold CCT. A 6 
(trial outcome) x 2 (age) mixed model ANOVA on experienced affect rating yielded no 
main effect of age or significant age by outcome interaction (p = ns).4 
Aggregate affective forecasting errors among young and older participants were 
computed by comparing their predicted and experienced affect ratings, parsed into 
anticipatory (forecast ratings) and outcome (experienced ratings) phases. As expected and 
consistent with past literature, data revealed that participants experienced affective 
forecasting errors: A 2 (study phase: forecast vs. experience) x 6 (CCT trial outcome) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Because individual performance on the task might influence one’s experienced emotional response to trial 
outcomes, we also explored whether CCT score correlated with experienced affective response. We found 
that higher trial scores were associated with greater increases in valence in response to the highest gain 
outcome type; r = .32, p < .05, n = 40. Thus, people who performed better on the CCT also perceived the 
best outcome as being more positive. However, overall CCT scores did not correlate with forecast ratings, 
suggesting that people who were more successful in the CCT did not forecast that they would feel better or 
worse than those who performed more poorly. Winnings (overall or by trial type) were not correlated with 
age, income, or any other demographic measure. 
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mixed-effects ANOVA on affect ratings yielded a significant trial type by phase 
interaction, F(5, 912) = 7.07, p < .001. In line with research on the impact bias, 
participants erred in anticipating greater positive outcomes in response to gains than was 
actually experienced (See Supplementary Figure S2). 
To examine individual differences in affective forecasting, for each participant 
and trial outcome type, we calculated an affective forecasting error score, which was 
defined as the difference between participants’ predicted and experienced affective 
response.  As predicted, young and old adults differed in their ability to predict affective 
reactions to monetary outcomes in the Hot CCT version. A 6 (trial outcome) x 2 (age 
group: young versus old) ANOVA for Hot CCT trials on forecasting errors yielded a 
significant main effect of age, qualified by an age by trial outcome type interaction; F(1, 
906) = 13.05, p < .001; F(5, 906) = 3.62, p = .002. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the 
age by CCT trial outcome interaction was driven by whether the outcome was a loss or 
gain. A 2 (trial outcome: loss versus gain) x 2 (age group) ANOVA yielded a main effect 
of outcome and age, qualified by an age by outcome type interaction; F(1, 918) = 20.21, 
p < .001; F(1, 918) = 5.29, p = .022; F(1, 918) = 8.03, p = .004. As predicted, younger 
adults made larger forecasting errors compared with their older counterparts. Paired 
contrasts revealed that older adults made reduced affective forecasting errors compared 
with young adults for all gain outcomes. However, age differences in forecasting 
accuracy were not observed in the loss domain as in the gain domain (Table 1 Panel B). 
The effect of age remained highly significant after controlling for baseline affect and 
demographic variables. 
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Trial Outcome (A) Forecasting (B) Forecasting Errors 
 Young Old F Young Old F 
CCT Loss       
     Low -1.10 (.17) -0.55 (.18) 6.49* 1.12 (.13) 0.74 (.13) 0.74 
     Med -2.41 (.10) -1.82 (.13) 14.46** 0.52 (.12) 0.42 (.11) 0.41 
     High -2.25 (.09) -2.23 (.10) 1.98 0.38 (.09) 0.33 (.12) 2.12 
CCT Gain       
     Low 1.07 (.15) 0.79 (.16) 1.80 1.13 (.13) 0.73 (.13) 4.67 * 
     Med 1.85 (.13) 1.53 (.14) 3.69* 0.86 (.12) 0.50 (.11) 4.68 * 
     High 2.56 (.09) 2.10 (.13) 8.94** 1.19 (.15) 0.82 (.13) 3.90 * 
	  
Table 1. Age differences in (A) affective forecast ratings and (B) affective forecast errors 
for Hot CCT Trials: Means (and Standard Errors). Statistical comparisons represent post-
hoc pairwise contrasts for individual CCT outcome types between age groups. * < .05, ** 
< .01 
In contrast, and as predicted, age differences in affective forecasting error size 
were not observed in Cold CCT trials. A trial outcome type by age mixed-effects 
ANOVA on forecasting errors yielded only a significant main effect for outcome type, 
but no main effect of age, F(1, 912) = 0.03, ns, or age by outcome type interaction; F(5, 
912) = 0.87, ns. Age differences in forecasting accuracy were not observed for any loss or 
gain outcomes types in the Cold CCT (see Supplementary Information). 
2.4 Discussion 
  
Young and old adults differed in their ability to predict affective reactions to 
monetary outcomes in the affective version of a dynamic decision making task, but not in 
the deliberative version. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that age 
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differences in affective forecasting may depend on the influence of hot processes in 
decision behavior; a finding that may account for the previous mixed results regarding 
age differences in affective forecasting. Importantly, forecasting accuracy was enhanced 
with age for gain outcomes, such that seniors were less likely than younger adults to 
make the typical errors of overestimating positive affect.  However, age differences in 
forecasting accuracy were not observed for loss outcomes, a result consistent with past 
research, which found older adults to be better than younger adults at forecasting their 
emotional experience only after a positive event (Scheibe et al., 2011). The absence of 
forecasting benefits for negative events coheres with research on the positivity bias in 
older adults, which suggests that older adults avoid negative information and show lower 
neural activation of losses (Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Samanez-Larkin, et al., 2007). 
Our results suggest that in situations of heightened emotional arousal, a positivity effect 
may occur for judgments about future events, such that older adults are more accurate 
than younger adults about forecasting responses to positive events, but not negative 
events.  
Our results are also in line with the contention that affective forecasts, and to a 
lesser extent actual emotional reactions, reflect general age-related shifts toward reduced 
intensity of self-reported emotional experience (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Schuman & 
Presser, 1981): In response to a loss, older adults both forecasted and experienced less of 
an increase in negative emotion than younger adults. In response to gains, older adults 
forecasted and experienced less of an increase in positive emotion.  It is possible that 
reduced negative anticipatory affect in older adults may aid in decision making outside of 
the lab by allowing for more dispassionate, less affect-based processing. This hypothesis 
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was corroborated by Figner et al. (2007), who found that adolescents, but not older 
adults, displayed increased risk-taking and simplified information use in the Hot, but not 
Cold version of the CCT. 
Importantly, and consistent with Scheibe et al. (2011), age differences in 
forecasted affect were more apparent than age differences in experienced affect. Younger 
adults anticipated greater increases in positive emotion, yet their actual emotional 
reactions did not reflect these expectations. It has been suggested that exaggerated 
forecasts are advantageous in that they encourage an individual to work eagerly towards 
achieving states that are predicted to produce strong emotional reactions (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). If affective forecasts are influenced by one’s representations of future 
rewards, then reduced intensity and more accurate forecasts may be associated with delay 
of gratification, improved emotion regulation, and increased patience in older adults.  
Indeed, some results from the temporal discounting literature suggest that as 
people age, they discount the value of delayed rewards less steeply and are thus more 
patient relative to young adults (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Li et al., 2013; Reips, 
2002). If one component of temporal discounting is governed by a hot system responding 
primarily to immediate rewards (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007), then age-related 
improvements in affective forecasting ability may confer advantages in down-regulating 
the hot system in favor of a more deliberate consideration of future rewards. Drawing on 
recent work that highlights the important roles of hot processes in temporal discounting 
behavior (Ifcher & Zarghamee, 2011; Löckenhoff, O’Donoghue, & Dunning, 2011; 
McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004; Lerner, Li, & Weber, 2013; Pyone & 
Isen 2011), we next turn to the question of whether age differences in affective 
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forecasting extend to long term affective forecasts and hedonic forecasting biases routed 
in temporal discounting.  
 





Drawing on Experiment 1 results, we examine whether age differences in 
affective forecasting accuracy extend to a bias known as future anhedonia, which 
suggests that representations of future events evoke less intense affect than do 
representations of present events (Kassam et al., 2008). In the context of temporal 
discounting, greater accuracy in affective forecasting should include the recognition that 
an event should produce similar affective responses at the time of the event occurring, 
regardless of whether the event occurs immediately or at some point in the future. Based 
on Experiment 1 results, we hypothesized that age-related improvements in affective 
forecasting ability would extend to older adults having more accurate interpretations of 
trade-offs among present and future rewards. Specifically, we predicted that future 
anhedonia errors would decrease across the lifespan, such that younger adults would be 
more likely to mistakenly believe that they would experience less intense affect when an 
event happened in the future than when the same event happened in the present. 
Relatedly, we also predicted that age differences in future anhedonia errors would 
mediate age differences in temporal discounting behavior and greater patience among 
older adults.  
3.2 Methods 
 
3.2.1 Sample and Procedure 
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In Experiment 2a, a continuous age sample of 618 US participants, ranging in age 
from 18 to 86 years of age (M = 45.6, SD = 16.3), were recruited from the Columbia 
University’s Virtual Lab Panel to participate in a web-based survey consisting of 
cognitive, decision-making, and demographic measures. Age was positively correlated 
with years of education (r = .14, p < .001) but not related to level of household incomes 
(r = .04, p = ns). Eighty percent of the sample was Caucasian and 60 percent were 
women (see Supplementary Table S1 for further details on subject recruitment and a 
breakdown of demographic details). 
To assess affective state at baseline, participants were first asked to rate their 
current affect immediately before the beginning of the trial. Participants were then given 
an intertemporal choice forecasting scenario in which they were asked to estimate their 
present reaction to a present financial event, and their future reaction to a future financial 
outcome at the time of its occurrence in a between-subject design (based on the 
methodology used by Kassam et al., 2008). To measure future anhedonia for financial 
gains, participants were asked, “If you were given $100 dollars right now, how happy 
would you be?” and “If you were given 100 dollars three months from now, how happy 
would you be at that time?  They made estimates on a 9-point scale anchored from not at 
all happy to extremely happy. We also explored future anhedonia errors for temporal 
gains by asking participants how happy they would be today [in 3 months], upon 
discovering that they had an unexpected hour of free time (See Supplementary 
Information for full question text for Experiment 2). Finally, we assessed future 
anhedonia for financial losses using the questions, “If you lost $100 dollars right now [3 
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months from now], how sad would you be [at that time]?” (1= not at all sad; 9 = 
extremely sad). 
 In Experiment 2b (N = 478), we examined whether a standard economic measure 
of value—willingness to pay—revealed age differences in future anhedonia when the 
focal event involved receipt of a consumer good. Study 2b was run three months after 
Study 2a, and a subset of participants from Study 2a were asked to read two scenarios. 
The present scenario asked participants to predict their reactions to a present event on the 
same scale used in Experiment 2a (“Imagine that as a promotion today, Amazon® gave 
you a boxset of DVDs of your favorite TV show, worth $100.00…How happy would you 
feel today if you were given this gift today?”) and to estimate their willingness to pay 
(“Now imagine that Amazon® is considering selling the boxset at a discounted price 
instead…What is the maximum amount of dollars you would be willing to pay today to 
receive this gift?”). In the future scenario, participants were asked to imagine receiving 
the boxset in 3 months, to rate how happy they would be when they received the gift at 
that time, and also to estimate their willingness to pay in 3 months. 
 Across experiments, we measured individual time preference, which is the degree 
to which people discount future gains and losses. Participants completed the adaptive 
DEEP Time task (Toubia, Johnson, Evgeniou, & Delquié, 2013), a tool that presents 20 
adaptive binary choices between smaller, sooner amounts and larger, later amounts, and 
estimates participants’ discount rates using Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo 
methods. Importantly, the DEEP Time task estimates the quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
function, which includes both standard, exponential discounting of future consequences 
and “present bias” (Laibson, 1997b), or how much a decision maker discounts all future 
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rewards regardless of delay length. For a full discussion of this adaptive, method and its 
Bayesian estimation procedure, including validity checks of the estimation of discounting 




3.3.1 Study 1a 
Consistent with Kassam et al (2008), Study 2a aggregate data showed that 
participants demonstrated future anhedonia for financial gains. They predicted that they 
would be happier upon receiving $100 in the present (M = 8.57, SD = .81) than upon 
receiving $100 in the future (M = 8.26, SD = 1.08), t(618) = 9.03, p  < .0001.5 
Participants also demonstrated future anhedonia when the variable of interest was an hour 
of free time. They predicted that they would be happier upon receiving one hour of free 
time in the present (M = 7.86, SD = 1.29) than upon receiving one hour of free time in the 
future (M = 7.52, SD = 1.49), t(618) = 7.23, p < .0001.  However, future anhedonia did 
not extend to the realm of financial losses. Participants did not predict that they would be 
sadder upon losing $100 in the present (M = 7.44, SD = 2.33) than upon losing $100 in 
the future (M = 7.43, SD = 2.25), t(618) = -0.03, p = ns.  
We next explore individual-level results to determine whether younger adults 
exhibited greater future anhedonia errors relative to older adults. Participants who 
indicated that they would be happier in the present than the future were considered to 
have made a future anhedonia error. Consistent with our hypotheses, older adults were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 To verify that future anhedonia errors would also persist in a between-subject web-based design (and 
were not the influence of carry-over effects), half of participants in another study were asked how happy 
they would be to receive $20 right now, while the other half were asked how happy they would be if they 
received $20 in 3 months time. Participants exhibited future anhedonia: Those who were asked how they 
would feel if they received $20 now predicted that they would be happier (M = 8.0, SD = 1.25) compared 
with those subjects asked about receiving $20 in 3 months (M = 7.78, SD = 1.3), t(612) = 2.23, p =  .01. 
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less likely than younger adults to commit future anhedonia errors for the $100 gain, 
temporal scenario, and loss scenario; β = -1.18, z = -4.41, p < .001, β = -1.03, z = -4.19, p 
< .001, β = -2.23, z = -3.36, p < .001.  
For each forecasting scenario, we calculated for each participant a future 
anhedonia index which was defined as the difference between participants’ predictions of 
their present reaction to a present event and their future reaction to a future event. For the 
$100 scenario, participants who felt that they would be happier in the future than the 
present were excluded from further analysis (2%). The mean future anhedonia index was 
0.31 for $100 gain (SD = 0.85) and 0.34 for one hour of time (SD = 1.15).  
A regression analysis with future anhedonia index for the $100 gain scenario as 
the dependent measure yielded a negative effect of the age, β = -0.18, t(601) = -4.56, p < 
.001, such that younger adults made greater errors compared to older adults, as shown in 
Figure 2. We also observe an age effect when the reward was an hour of free time: 
Participants who were most likely to believe that they would be happier upon receiving 
one hour of free time in the present than upon receiving one hour of time in the future 
were the younger participants β = -0.08, t(600) = -1.87, p = .06.  The effect of age 
remained highly significant after controlling for time preference, baseline affect and 
demographic variables (see Supplementary Information). However, we did not find a 
significant effect of age for the $100 loss scenario future anhedonia index, β = 0.05, 
t(600) = 1.21, p = ns. 
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Fig. 3. Mean Future Anhedonia Index by Age Group for $100 scenario in Study 2a. Error 
bars denote ±1 SEM. 
3.3.2 Time preference and future anhedonia 
We next examined whether future anhedonia errors, a forecasting bias predicated 
on temporal discounting behavior (Kassam et al., 2008), were related to components of 
an individual’s time preference.  As expected, exponential discount rate (δ) was 
correlated with future anhedonia index for an $100 r(607) = 0.20, p < .001, and for an 
extra hour of time, r(606) = .09, p < .05, indicating that the participants who were most 
likely to believe that they would be happier upon receiving $100 or an hour of time in the 
present than in the future were the participants who were least patient. Future anhedonia 
was also associated with higher present bias (the overvaluation of immediate outcomes). 
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displayed more present bias (a value β <1 indicates present bias), money: r(607) = -.23, p 
< .001; time: r(606) = -.13, p < .001.6  Age was also a significant predictor of time 
preference. Older adults displayed less present bias and lower exponential discount rates 
compared to younger adults, β: r(608) = .10, p < .05; δ: r(608) = -.09, p < .05.  
Importantly, future anhedonia error can be considered as fully mediating the 
effect of age on time preference: Exponential discount rate: age, direct: t(609) = -2.31, 
age, mediated: t(609) = -1.59, boot-strapped Sobel’s Z = -2.99, p = .002. Present bias: 
age, direct: t(609) = 2.53, age, mediated: t(609) = 1.71, boot-strapped Sobel’s Z = 3.16, p 
< .001. Thus, age differences in future anhedonia errors may partially explain why 
aspects of time discounting behavior improve with advanced age. 
3.3.3 Study 2b 
Results from Experiment 2b confirmed that age differences in future anhedonia 
extend to the receipt of consumer goods and willingness to pay. Overall, participants 
predicted that they would be happier upon receiving a DVD box-set today  (M = 7.53, SD 
= 1.63) than upon receiving it in 3 months (M = 7.02, SD = 1.84), t(472) = 8.60, p  < 
.0001, MFA Index = 0.5, SD = 1.28). Participants were moderately more willing to pay for 
goods in the present (M = $29.63, SD = $27.86) than in 3 months (M = $26.63, SD = 
$25.70), t(472) = 1.72, p = .08, MFA Index = $3.0). Importantly, and consistent with 
Experiment 2a results, there was a negative relationship between age and future 
anhedonia index regarding receipt of the gift. A regression with future anhedonia index as 
the dependent measure yielded a significant effect of age, β = -0.10, t(471) = -2.07, p < 
.05. Similarly, younger adults showed greater discrepancies in willingness to pay for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Beta and delta were not related to future anhedonia of losses; β: r(454) = .064, p = .17;  δ: r(464) = -.05, p 
= .27.	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box-set at a discounted price: β = -0.12, t(471) = -2.65, p < .01. This effect of age on 
future anhedonia index remained significant after controlling for demographic factors and 




Consistent with our predictions and Study 1 results, we found a negative 
relationship between age and future anhedonia errors. These findings suggest that with 
advanced age comes the awareness that events will likely feel the same, regardless of 
whether they occur in the immediate present or at some delay in the future. Although all 
participants mistakenly believed that a receipt of a monetary gain, an hour of free time, or 
a consumer good would bring them less happiness when it happened in the future than 
when it happened in the present, younger adults were even more likely to believe that 
their future feelings would be less intense than their present feelings. As in Experiment 1, 
age differences in affective forecasting were observed for gains, but not observed for loss 
outcomes. 
It has been speculated that future anhedonia occurs because representations of 
future events evoke less intense affect than representations of present events. With 
increased age and experience, seniors may hold more accurate beliefs about the value of 
future rewards, as emotional knowledge becomes a more important input in decision 
making (Mather, 2006; Peters et al., 2000; Peters et al., 2007). Accumulated experiences 
with more affect-based feedback may be needed to reduce the tendency towards future 
anhedonia. 
Notably, these findings offer an interesting extension of age differences in 
affective forecasting into the realm of temporal discounting research. Our results indicate 
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that lifespan changes in affective forecasting may be linked to age differences in temporal 
discounting. We found that future anhedonia index mediated the effect of age on time 
preference. Youthful short-sightedness has been implicated as a cause of poor judgment 
in risky decision-making. Increased future anhedonia in younger adults may be related to 
their tendency to maximize immediate gains, and to overweight consequences in the 
present relative to those that they expect to occur later.  
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The literature on affective forecasting is broad and wide-ranging, but has largely 
neglected a thorough investigation of individual differences. There is abundant evidence 
that individuals make systematic errors when predicting future emotional states, which 
can lead to suboptimal decisions (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Kermer et al., 2006). There is 
not, however, a great deal of research specifically examining whether older adults share 
these deficits in properly predicting affective responses to decision outcomes. The present 
set of findings suggest that older adults may be better at predicting their responses to 
outcomes and that these predictions may accurately influence and guide their decision 
making processes. Results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that older adults display 
distinct patterns of gain-related affective reactions for both predicted affect, specifically 
in situations of heightened emotional arousal. Forecasting accuracy improved with age 
for gain outcomes in an affective version of a dynamic decision making task, but not in 
the deliberative version, such that older adults were less likely to make the typical errors 
of overestimating positive affect. Results from Experiment 2 revealed that age-related 
improvements in affective forecasting extend to long-term forecasts routed in temporal 
discounting behavior. Future anhedonia errors decreased with age, with seniors being less 
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likely to mistakenly believe that they would experience less intense affect when a reward 
happened in the future than in the present. These results also provide support for the 
hypothesized influence of affective forecasting ability on time preference and greater 
patience in older adults.  
Given age-related cognitive losses and declines in physical health, it is critical to 
investigate whether other forms of knowledge, such as affect, may help to compensate for 
and mitigate declines in decision-making. Taken together, our findings add to the 
literature on age-related differences in decision-making by suggesting that affective 
forecasting is a skill that does not decrease across the lifespan, and thus may tap cognitive 
and affective abilities that increase with the experience that comes with age. Despite a 
body of research that suggests that older adults are impaired on simple judgment tasks, 
results from the present experiments are consistent with literature demonstrating that 
emotion-related abilities, such as recognizing emotion states (Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe, & 
Bulka, 1989), emotion regulation (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003) and ignoring 
interpersonal stressors (Neupert, Almeida, & Charles, 2007) are relatively spared or even 
enhanced in advancing age. Our findings are also consistent with an emerging body of 
research which suggests that experience and accumulated knowledge may help 
compensate for declining cognitive function in decision-making among older adults (for a 
review on this literature, see Zaval, Weber, Li, & Johnson, forethcoming), and that 
emotional knowledge, in particular, may help to compensate for the declines in decision-
making that come with advanced age.  
Our research further highlights the importance of distinguishing between the 
deliberative and affective processes of decision behavior when studying age-related 
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changes in decision-making skills. If affect is critical to everyday choice processes and if 
older adults are better at effectively forecasting affect, then they may make better choices 
in situations of heightened emotional arousal, despite analytic declines. Future research 
should not ignore the widespread evidence for age-related preservation and enhancement 
in social cognitive function, and should instead build upon previous research to focus 
efforts on discovering the practical implications of potential age differences. Additional 
work is therefore needed to examine whether superior affective forecasting abilities 
contribute to older adults’ practical problem-solving skills or planning for the future.  
Such work could provide preliminary insight into understanding how older adults make 
long-term decisions regarding their emotional well-being (including financial or medical 
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Effects of Age on Affective Forecasting Ability 
Supplementary Information 
 
Supplementary Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the study samples as a whole 










N 156 81 75 
Gender, % female 67.9 75.3 60 
Age, M (SD) 47.2 22.5 (1.48) 67.6 (5.0) 
Race/ethnicity %    
      African American 7.1 8.6 5.3 
      Asian 13 23.5 1.3 
      White 79 64.2 92 
Education 56.1 35.6 59.7 












N 146 181 151 141 
Age, M  24.5 38.3 54.0 67.5 
Gender, % female 68 50 70 56 
Race/ethnicity % white 66 77 87 93 
Income 45 75 65 55 
Education 83 88 84 91 
Study 2b     
N 96 147 121 114 
Sex, % female 66 48 70 57 
Age, M  24.3 38.55 53.9 67.9 
Race/ethnicity % white 58 80 87 95 
Income 35 75 65 55 
Education 83 88 83 89 
 
Due to some participants choosing not to answer, the race/ethnicity, political affiliation 
columns do not total to 100. 
*Education = some college or higher; Income = median in thousands 
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Supplementary Figure 1-A. Hot CCT card presentation screen. 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Affective forecasting accuracy by age group for Hot CCT 
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Supplementary Table 2. Linear regressions for future anhedonia $100 in Study 2a. Note: 
Standardized regression coefficients in parentheses. Sample size is smaller for some 
regressions due to incomplete responses. * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.  
 
Model 1 2 3 
Age -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.16) 
Present bias (β)  -1.11*** -1.08*** 
  (-0.24) (-0.23) 
Education   0.004 
   (0.009) 
Income (thousands)   0.002* 
   (0.10) 
Male   0.145* 
   (0.09) 
Constant 0.762*** 1.76*** 1.56*** 
Observations 602 592 584 











	   106	  
Supplementary Methods 
 
Study 1 Affective Forecasting Survey (Hot trials example) 
The questions below ask you to imagine that you are playing the Columbia Card 
Task. Use the scales below to predict how happy you would feel in the following 
hypothetical cases. Please be as accurate and honest as you can be. For all of the 
questions below, specifically imagine that you are playing in a round where there are 8 
loss cards, with gain cards worth +30 points, and loss cards worth -90 points. 
 
1. How do you predict you would feel if the first or second card you turned over was 
a loss card and ended the game (score of -90 or -60)? 
2. How do you predict you would you feel if the third or fourth card you turned over 
was a loss card and ended the game (score of -30 or 0)?  
3. How do you predict you would feel if the fifth card or greater that you turned over 
was a loss card and ended the game (score of +30 or greater)? 
Again imagine that you are playing the Columbia Card Task in a round with 8 loss cards, 
with gain cards worth +30 points and loss cards worth -90 points. Now imagine that you 
chose to end the round yourself, and never encountered a loss card. 
1. How do you predict you would feel if you chose to end the round after selecting 
one or two gain cards (score of +30 or +60)? 
2. How do you predict you would feel if you chose to end the round after selecting 
three or four gain cards (score of +90 or +120)? 
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3. How do you predict you would feel if you chose to end the round after selecting 
five or more gain cards (score of +150 or greater)? 
 
Supplementary Text 2. Study 2b Question Text 
 
1. Imagine that as a promotion today, Amazon ® gave you a boxset of DVDs of 
your favorite TV show, worth $100.00. Imagine yourself receiving the boxset 
today, and watching some of your favorite episodes. How happy would you feel if 
you were given this gift today? 
2. Now imagine that Amazon ® is considering selling the DVD boxset at a 
discounted price instead. What is the maximum of dollars you would be willing to 
pay today to receive this gift today? (Please enter an amount between 0 - 100) 
3. Now imagine that you were given the DVD boxset three months from now. How 
happy do you think you would be when you received the gift at that time? 
4. Now imagine that, in three months, Amazon ® is considering selling the DVD 
boxset at a discounted price instead. Three months from now, what is the 
maximum amount of dollars you would be willing to pay for the boxset? (Please 
enter an amount between 0 - 100) 
 
Study 2a and 2b Participants 
 
Participants from Studies 2a and 2b were recruited from the Columbia 
University’s Center for Decision Sciences' Virtual Lab Panel (N = 469) and from a 
private survey sampling company (N = 150). Participants completed four waves of a web-
based survey consisting of cognitive, decision-making, and demographic measures. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 86 and were recruited in four age groups: young 
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from ages 18 to 30 (M = 24.46, Median = 24, SD = 3.36), middle-younger from 31 to 45 
(M = 38.32, Median = 38, SD = 4.47), middle-older from 46 to 60 (M = 54.01, Median = 
55, SD = 3.88), and old from 61 to 86 (M = 67.47, Median = 67, SD = 4.91). All 
participants were U.S. residents and indicated English as their native language. 
Participants were emailed invitations to complete the Study 2a between January and April 
2013. Study 2b participants completed the study in July 2013.  
 Table S1 shows demographic information by age group. Older participants were 
somewhat more educated than younger participants, with a higher percentage attaining 
post-graduate degrees (from old to young, 42.8% vs. 15.9% vs. 14% vs. 5.5.0%, χ2(3) = 
71.4, p < .01) and more years of education on average (from old to young, 15.8 vs. 14.5 
vs. 15.1 vs. 14.6,, F(1, 612) = 9.02, p < .01). However, they had similar levels of 
household income (medians, Medold = $58.6K and Medyoung = $61.1K, t = .58, ns), 
somewhat higher than the U.S. median of $49,445 in 2010 (U.S. Census). Household 
income was positively correlated with years of education (r = .12, p < .01). 
 
 
 
 
	  
